COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES


# EUROBAROMETER 

## PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY


..." Determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Eureopan Social Charter, notably freedom, equal ity and social justice, "
..." Aware of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its cormon interests and independence, in particular to display the principles of democracy and compl iance with the law and with human rights to which they are at tached, so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the framework of the United Nations Charter. ". . .

## Joint declaration

by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1977

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION,

Whereas the Treaties establishing the European Communities are based on the principle of respect for the law;

Whereas, as the Court of Justice has recognized, that law comprises, over and athove the rules embodied in the treaties and secondary Community legislation, the general principles of law and in particular the fundamental rights, principles and rights on which the constitutional law of the Member States is based;

Whereas, in particular, all the Member States are Contracting Parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950,

## Have adopted the following declaration:

1. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stress the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
2. In the exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European Communities they respect and will continue to respect these rights.

Done at Luxembourg on the fifth day of April in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven.

## DECLARATION AGAINST RACISM AND XENOPHOBLA

$$
\text { of } 11 \text { June } 1986
$$

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCH, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBER STATES, MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL, AND THE COMMISSION,

Recognizing the existence and growth of xenophobic attitudes, movements and acts of violence in the Community which are offen directed against immigrants;

Whereas the Community insuiwtions attach prime importance to respect for fundamental rights, as solemnly proclaimed in the Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977, and to the principle of freedom of movement as laid down in the Treaty of Rome;

Whereas respect for human dignity and the elimination of forms of racial discrimination are part of the common cultural and legal heritage of all the Member States;

Mindful of the positive contribution which workers who have their origins in other Member States or in third countrics have made, and can continue to make, to the development of the Member State in which they legally reside and of the resuluing benefits for the Community as a whole,

1. vigoronsly condemn all forms of incolerance, hosility and use of force against persons or groups of persons on the grounds of racial, religious, cultural, social or national differences;
2. affirm their resolve to protect the individualiry and dignity of every member of society and to reject any form of segregation of foreigners;
3. Look upon it as indispensable that all necessary steps be taken to guarantee that this joint resolve is carried through;
4. are determined to pursue the endeavours already made to protect the individualiry and digniry of every member of society and to reject any form of segregation of foreigners;
5. stress the importance of adequate and objective information and of making all citizens aware of the dangers of racism and xenophobia, and the need to ensure that all acts or forms of discrimination are prevented or curbed.

# Survey : Racism, xenophobia and intolerance Note 

Respect for human rights and democratic principles are part of a common European ideological and political legacy.

The following figures are sufficient evidence: for $78 \%$ of all Europeans, democracy is the best of regimes and respect for human rights is, for $60 \%$, one of those great causes that are worthwhile.

Nevertheless, a certain intolerance towards persons or groups of persons with different racial, religious, cultural, social or national backgrounds is evident. The importance and urgency of the challenges Europe is confronted with these days, requires that it observes great democratic vigilance and assumes the political responsibilities that come with it.

The Community's mandate should consist in constructing a community with a social dimension aimed at safeguarding individuals' interests. The involvement of the European Institutions in promoting and safeguarding human rights and democratic principles, together with the Member States' governments should be strengthened, according to $48 \%$ of those questioned.

The Community should remain faithful to its conception of social and individual life. She ows it to herself and to her citizens to redouble her efforts in order to reply to these fundamental assignments.

Conducting a survey on racism and xenophobia in Europe is among the recommendations, in the report of the European Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the rise of fascism and racism in Europe (December 1985), as well as in the draft Resolution concerning the fight against racism and xenophobia that the Commission presented to the Council.

The survey on racism and xenophobia in Europe, carried out by the Commission of the European Communities in collaboration with the European Parliament, was conducted in October and November 1988. The survey was based on a representative sample of the citizens of the twelve Member States of the European Community.

The survey focuses on civil liberties and civil rights, on attitudes to and opinions about "others" and opinions on immigration policy in the European Community.

Several elements have to be taken into consideration when interpreting the results of this survey:
a) The percentage of the foreign population residing in EC Member States varies considerably.

There is a higher number of foreigners in Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg than in Denmark, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. As a consequence, comparisons within both groups are relatively easier to make than comparisons between both groups.
b) The origins of the foreign population or of ethnic groups residing in EC Member States is diverse.

The proportion of EC citizens among the foreign population of Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland and Spain is relatively high, while the majority of foreigners residing in the other Member States come from nonEC regions.
c) For these people, the motives of migration vary according to origin and professional qualification.

Immigrants' way of life vary according to their social status, religion, race, nationality and culture. Attitudes of indigineous residents vary accordingly.

## RESULTS:

1. "Otherness" was researched following the criteria of nationality, race, religion, culture and social class. These criteria are the ones used in the inter-Institutional Declaration of 1986 against racism and xenophobia. For each category, the same question was put: "When you hear about people of another (nationality/race/religion/culture/social class), whom do you think of?" the following spontaneous answers were given:

With regard to nationality, European countries can be divided into a number of groups:

- countries such as Belgium or Germany where a number of nationalities are mentioned with comparable frequencies;
- countries such as Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom where associations made by respondents clearly point to non-European populations;
- finally, in countries with a low level of immigration (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal), people find it difficult to identify a nonnational and tend to mention European nationals as foreigners;
- in this context, Luxembourg seems to be a special case: only Europeans are mentioned.

With regard to the other race, in all European countries, with the exception of France and the United Kingdom, the association of foreigners with the black race is most common. In France, it tends to be Arabs, whereas in the United Kingdom the answers usually refer to Indians.

The inclination among respondents to mention a particular type of population, varies from one country to another.

At Community level, the other religion is clearly Islam. Islam is mentioned by more than half the respondents in Belgium and France, and by more than seven out of ten people in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.

Ireland is an exception: for six out of ten people, "others" are Protestants. In the other countries there is a fairly wide spread (particularly in the United Kingdom, Italy and Greece), while in Spain and Portugal, people found it hard to answer the question.

The problems experienced in defining the other culture have led to answers broadly based on the preceding three categories.

Coming to the other social class, the pattern clearly changes; most respondents mention the rich, the upper class and the poor.
2. Respect for human rights and fundamental liberties are part of a common European legacy of political traditions and ideals. For $78 \%$ of all Europeans, democracy is the best of regimes. Respect for human rights is, to $60 \%$, one of the great causes "which are worth the trouble of taking risks and making sacrifices for".
3. Eight out of ten people disapprove of racist movements. The more people tend to disapprove of these movements, the more they tend to approve of anti-racist movements. What people feel about these movements is related to the way they feel about democracy.
4. Human diversity in Europe has been considered from two angles: the way Europeans perceive that diversity in their country in general, and the way they perceive it in daily life"
4.1. At Community level most people agree that there is considerable human diversity, especially in terms of nationality, race and religion.

One European in three believes there are too many people of another nationality or race in his country.

A clear separation emerges between Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy) and Ireland on the one hand, and the other countries of the Community on the other: this is not so much a north-south division, as a reflection of different traditions in terms of history and migration between countries with a longstanding tradition of emigration and those with considerable immigrant populations on their territories, whose presence is linked to a colonial past.

A correlation can be found between a strong sense of national pride and a feeling that "there are too many foreigners around". Advancing age, a lower education level, a tendency towards "materialism" and right wing leanings go hand in hand with the feeling there are too many "others".
4.2. Not many EC-citizens declare mixing with "others" in their neighbourhood, or consider them as their friends.

This varies from country to country. Generally speaking, human diversity in a "neighbourhood" context would seem to be greatest in the Netherlands, France and Belgium.

On average, one European in three has occupational contact with a person of a different nationality.

There is not more intolerance among those who have every-day contact with "others", than there is among those who have no such contacts.
5. Regardless of the category refered to, a large majority of Europeans claim to have no problems in living together with "others".

Nevertheless, the answers vary from one country to another; the Belgians and Germans have the greatest difficulties in living with the "otherness". Two variables are particularly significant here: level of education and selfplacement on the "left-right-scale"

At the national level most concern as regards "foreigners" is found in the following case: foreigners belonging to the largest immigrant group within a country, having migrated for economic reasons, and whose characteristics differ notably from the indigeneous population.

Although refugees were not mentioned in the survey, some respondents seem to have had such populations in mind when answering certain questions.
6. For nearly one out of every two Europeans, the presence of immigrants in their country is seen as a rather positive factor for the future. A considerable minority of those questioned, however, held the opposite view.
7. By and large, Europeans are well disposed towards suggestions to improve relations between nationals and non-nationals. This attitude tends to become less marked, however, when proposals are made which require a greater personal input (learning a language, for instance) or when proposals acquire a certain normative character (as in the case of naturalization, for example).

One European in three would like to see the adoption of Community-wide legislation in relation to non-nationals residing in a Member State. This confirms the justness of the Commission decision of 8 July 1988 on this matter.

On the other hand, only one European in five is in favour of unilateral decisions taken by individual Member States with respect to foreigners from third states.
8. Problems with migration in some EC countries do not indicate that those citizens reject democratic principles and values. On the contrary, three out of four EC-citizens are in favour of improving, or at least maintaining the rights of immigrants and they count on the European Institutions to do this.

It is now up to the European Institutions to take the appropriate measures in the field of integration and tolerance of people with different nationality, race, religion and culture, taking the direction indicated by the opinion of the majority of EC-citizens.

RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND INTOLERANCE

Human rights and immigration
in the European Community

May 1989


## FOREWORD

This survey represents the first harmonized European study on the way the citizens of the European Cormunity perceive the problems of racism, xenophobia and intolerance. It is an ambitious project and it is no more than fair to point out its limitations.

Since we were moving in unknown territory the study had to explore all major aspects of the subject, while at the same time making a number of fundamental choices with regard to its ultimate scope. This may leave the reader with the impression that certain themes have not been dealt with in sufficient depth; the authors themselves exercise the greatest caution in interpreting the results and they advise the reader to do the same. Hopefully, this initiative will be followed by many more similar investigations.

The questionnaire is not only limited in scope - although more than 40 questions were asked - it also suffers at times from a lack of precision in the way it has been drafted. Regrettable though this may be, it arises from the need to draw up an international and clearly harmonized questionnaire. This precludes different formulations for individual countries and does not always do justice to highly speaific national situations where they exist. It is nevertheless clear that without harmonizing questions at an international level one cannot make meaningful comparisons between countries, which was a prime objective - and a unique feature - of this study.

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## InIPRODOCIION

## THE IMPORTANCE KUROPEANS AITACH TO THE ISSUR

Racism, xenophobia and immigration, issues which throughout the 1980's have been hotly debated by politicians and the media. What this survey has set out to do is to find out exactly how important these concerns are to Europeans in general. Two questions were put to them on this subject, to give us an idea of the relative importance attached to great causes dear to European hearts, and the order of priority of major contermporary problems.

## "Forthwhile great causes"

Question: In your opinion, in this list which are the great causes which nowadays are worth the trouble of taking risks and making sacrifices for?

## (Answer in order of preference) <br> *

- World peace 75
- Human rights 60
- The fight against poverty 57
. Protection of wildife 57
. Freedom of the individual 39
- The fight against racism 36
- Defence of country 30
- Sexual equality 25
- My religious faith 19
- The unification of Europe 18
- The revolution 5

None of these I
No reply 2
Total 1

1 The total exceeds 100 due to miltiple answers: average number of answers per respondent exceeds 4.

At Community level the cause most often mentioned is world peace. Then come human rights, which six out of ten Europeans consider worth taking risks for. In every country, with the exception of Iuxembourg, they are mentioned by more than one in two respondents. Although the fight against racism is only in sixth position it is none the less mentioned by more than one European in three. This proportion is lower in Denmark (29\%) and in Ireland (23\%).

The inclination to mention these two causes is to a large extent determined by the same socio-political variables, i.e. educational level, an inclination towards materialism, the leadership indicator, and political attitudes1: the higher one's educational level and incame, the more one is inclined to leadership and post-materialism, and the more one tends to have left wing leanings and attach importance to human rights and the fight against racism. Whereas sex does not seem to be a significant factor, age does play a part in as much as interest in the fight against raism tails off beyond the age of 40 . The effects of these variables tend to be more or less marked depending on which Member State one is talking about. It should be noted that in terms of the fight against racism the gap between the young and the not so young is much greater in Belgium, Germany and Iuxembourg. In France and Greece there is a clear correlation between having been to university and mentioning human rights as a major cause ( $80 \%$ and $74 \%$, respectively).

[^0]TABIE 1

## MORIHMHITE GREAT CAOSESS



## "The most and least important mrablems in your country"

Question: In your opinion, which of the problems that seem to face us nowadays is the most important? And which of these is the least important?
(In order of importance)

- Unemployment
49
4
- The pressure of modern living
22
9
- Fears about personal safety
13
- Young people do as they like, regardless
7
- The inmigrant population 5
. Loss of religious values 53
. None in particular 2
$2 \quad 14$
No reply

Least important

Total
1

It appears that, by and large, Europeans do not see immigration as a problem of the first order: in most countries we find it at the bottom of the list or in the last place but one. Southern countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) show an inclination to attach even less importance to the problem. What we see here is a rough division between inmigration and emigration countries.

The degree of importance attached to the problem of immigration varies littile with age, sex or educational level. The one variable which does come into play here is politics: the more one considers oneself to be on the right of the political spectrum, the more importance one attaches to the problem. The effect of this variable is, however, limited: the proportion of respondents who mention this as being the most important problem goes up by no more than seven points from extreme left to extreme right.

[^1]TABLE II
GREAT CAUSES WORTH TAKING RISKS AND MAKING SACRIFICES FOR

Sexual equality
Protection of wildiife
World peace
The Struggle against racism
Defence of country
Religious faith
The unification of Europe
Fight against poverty
Freedom of the individual
Human rights
The revolution
None of these
No reply

| B | DK | $\mathbf{D}$ | $\mathbf{G R}$ | $\mathbf{E}$ | $\mathbf{F}$ | $\mathbf{I R L}$ | $\mathbf{I}$ | $\mathbf{L}$ | $\mathbf{N L}$ | $\mathbf{P}$ | $\mathbf{U K}$ | $\mathbf{E C 1 2}$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{2 3}$ | 23 | 32 | 30 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 19 | 41 | 27 | 32 | 25 | 25 |
| 67 | 58 | 77 | 52 | 43 | 56 | 26 | 58 | 76 | 55 | 57 | 48 | $\mathbf{5 7}$ |
| 69 | 58 | 70 | 85 | 77 | 78 | 75 | 82 | 86 | 54 | 87 | 71 | 75 |
| 37 | 29 | 31 | 32 | 36 | 41 | 23 | 44 | 58 | 37 | 42 | 32 | 36 |
| 27 | 21 | 27 | 36 | 27 | 31 | 13 | 24 | 28 | 8 | 50 | 41 | 30 |
| 13 | 11 | 18 | 35 | 20 | 13 | 35 | 22 | 19 | 16 | 32 | 18 | 19 |
| 27 | 9 | 19 | 20 | 13 | 25 | 8 | 22 | 39 | 10 | 28 | 9 | 18 |
| 68 | 35 | 44 | 49 | 63 | 71 | 69 | 55 | 70 | 47 | 80 | 57 | 57 |
| 47 | 44 | 37 | 53 | 34 | 41 | 30 | 36 | 57 | 32 | 44 | 43 | 39 |
| 56 | 60 | 62 | 52 | 60 | 66 | 62 | 63 | 40 | 53 | 58 | 55 | 60 |
| 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 5 |
| 2 | 3 | 2 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 1 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 4 | 1 | 2 |

TABLE III
THE LEAST IMPORTANT PROBLRM IN (OOUNTRY)

The pressure of modern living
Fears about personal safety
Unemployment
Young people doing as they like regardless
Immigrant population
Loss of religious values
None in particular
No reply

The pressure of modern living
Fears about personal safety
Unemployment
Young people doing as they like regardless
Immigrant population
Loss of religious values
None in particular
No reply

| B | DK | D | GR | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | P | UK | EC12 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 17 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 17 | 9 | 15 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| 9 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 14 | 9 | 17 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| 3 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 10 | 9 | 20 | 20 | 10 | 12 | 19 | 24 | 9 | 14 | 6 | 12 | 16 |
| 13 | 7 | 13 | 26 | 11 | 10 | 18 | 23 | 10 | 16 | 23 | 19 | 16 |
| 28 | 25 | 30 | 19 | 35 | 47 | 17 | 23 | 26 | 31 | 20 | 37 | 33 |
| 20 | 19 | 13 | 18 | 20 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 29 | 10 | 30 | 11 | 14 |
| - | 32 | - | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | 16 | - | - | 1 |

TABLE IV
THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLBM IN (COUNIRY)

| B | DK | D | GR | E | F | IRL | I | L. | NL | P | $\mathbf{U K}$ | EC12 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 15 | 53 | 42 | 28 | 5 | 5 | 13 | 28 | 22 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 22 |
| 13 | 30 | 10 | 7 | 25 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 22 | 11 | 15 | 13 |
| 50 | 59 | 30 | 49 | 61 | 72 | 64 | 52 | -9 | 46 | 51 | 40 | 49 |
| 9 | 23 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 14 | 7 | 10 | 7 |
| 6 | 23 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 5 |
| 5 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 21 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 4 | - | - | - |

## CHAPTER i

EUROPEANS AND THE PROTECITION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHIS

The fight against racism and xenophobia is part of the general concern for human rights and democratic principles, both of which are cornerstones of European identity ${ }^{1}$.

In this time of economic and social upheaval foreigners and immigrants are often the butt of intolerance and xenophobia, which seems to originate in particular among groups that are not always very respectful of human rights.

To gauge the impact of this phenomenon and the effect of such ideas on European public opinion we had to obtain specific information, both on the commitment of Europeans to democratic values and human rights, and on their views on racist and anti-racist movements.

### 1.1. Europeans and their commitment to democratio values

We shall first look at commitment to democratic values, preferences regarding the alternative between freedom and equality, and opinions regarding racist and anti-racist movements.

### 1.1.1. Cormitment to democracy

## Question: Here are three opinions about political systems. Which one comes closest to your own way of thinking?

## \% KIC 12

- Democracy is the best political system in all circumstances ..... 78
- In certain circumstances a dictatorship could be a good thing ..... 9
. Whether we live in a democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me ..... 12
No reply ..... 1
Total ..... 100

1 See the joint declaration on the protection of human rights in the European Community (OJ No C 103, 7.4.1977).


Eight out of ten Europeans are unconditional supporters of democracy, while one in ten might support an authoritarian solution, ant ane in ten does not believe that the nature of the political system in his country would affect his life.

This breakdown of answers varies from one country to another. Thus, in Greece and Denmark, nine out of every ten people would always choose democracy. In three countries, on the other hand, more than one in ten people questioned believes that dictatorship might be a solution: these are Belgium (11\%), Germany (11\%) and Italy (13). Finally, indifference to the type of political system is particularly widespread in Ireland, where it reflects the views of one person out of every four.

Although age and sex seem to have little to do with it, high educational levels (and incomes) and an inclination towards leadership and post-materialist attitudes go hand in hand with a strong attachment to democracy. A low educational level, low income and limited leadership ratings tend to correspond to a certain degree of indifference regarding the existing political system and a feeling of exclusion.

The willingness to accept totalitarian solutions is to some extent influenced by socio-demographic factors. Two specific cases should be mentioned: on the extreme right there is more willingness to acoept such solutions, whereas the reverse is true for post-materialists.

It also seems that the degree of satisfaction with one's own Iife - but more particularly with democracy - has some bearing on the comnitment to democracy:

Level of satisfaction with Iifel

| Democracy <br> best <br> system | Dictatorship <br> sometimes | No <br> difference | No <br> reply | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6.81 | 6.34 | 6.16 | 6.06 | 6.68 |
| 5.89 | 4.82 | 4.64 | 4.93 | 5.64 |

1 For the wording of this question, see Annex.

TABTE 1.1 .1
OMMIIMENT TO DR:OCRACY

|  | Democracy always best | Dictatorship sometimes | Makes no difference | No reply | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agriegate | 78 | 9 | 12 | 1 | 100 |
| Sex |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 80 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 100 |
| Female | 77 | 8 | 14 | 1 | 100 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-24 | 76 | 10 | 13 | 1 | 100 |
| 25-39 | 80 | 8 | 11 | 1 | 100 |
| 40-54 | 80 | 8 | 11 | 1 | 100 |
| 55 and over | 76 | 9 | 14 | 1 | 100 |

Educational level

| Low | 75 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Average | 78 |

9
9
14
2100
$1 \quad 100$
Advanced
85
Level of income

| Low - | 74 | 10 | 18 | 1 | 100 |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - | 77 | 10 | 12 | 1 | 100 |
| + | 80 | 8 | 10 | 1 | 100 |
| High + + | 84 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 100 |

Leadership

| Strong + | 85 |
| :---: | :---: |
| + | 81 |
| - | 77 |


| 8 | 8 | 2 | 100 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 9 | 9 | 1 | 100 |
| 8 | 14 | 1 | 100 |
| 9 | 18 | 2 | 100 |

Post-materialism
Materialist 75
10

| 14 | 1 | 100 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 12 | 1 | 100 |
| 8 | 1 | 100 |

Political allediance

| Extreme left | $(1-2)$ | 80 | 7 | 11 | 2 | 100 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(3-4)$ | 83 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 100 |
|  | $(5-6)$ | 77 | 9 | 13 | 1 | 100 |
|  | $(7-8)$ | 81 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 100 |
| Extreme right $(9-10)$ | 75 | 13 | 11 | 1 | 100 |  |

### 1.1.2. Iiberty ar equality?

Question: Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion?
. I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to make up my mind for one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance.

- Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to make up my mind for one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong.
. Neither 8
. No reply4
TOTAL ..... 100

What is remarkable is that - Community-wide - the answers in favour of equality are evenly balanced with those in favour of liberty. Broken down by country, however, considerable variations appear. We can divide the Member States into three categories (see graph on following page):

- countries with a preference for liberty: Belgium, Dermark, Greece, the Netheriands and the United Kingdom;
- countries where equality is considered more important: Spain, Italy and Iuxembourg;
- countries where the two are considered equally important: Germany, France, Ireland and Portugal.

These answers can be explained in terms of a mumber of socio-political variables:

- higher educational levels and levels of income tend to predispose towards liberty;
- people who consider themselves right-wing also seem to be strongly attached to freedom.

BREAKDONIN BY COUSIRE OF THE PREFFGREMCE FOR EITHIER IIBERRII OR EXUALIIY


This study would therefore seem to confirm Jean Stoetzel's conclusion in "Les Valeurs du temps present"l, that the choice between freedom and equality is closely linked to political views, to the exclusion of almost anything else. Freedom is cherished by the right, equality by the left. He goes on to say that in all West European countries and in Japan, those who state that equality means more to them than freedom tend to be to the left of centre politically. The sociological or psychological factors which we normaily associate with such differences in attitude or judgment do not seem to play an important role here. An exception, however, has to be made for social level and level of income. The better-off prefer freedom, the less well-off go for equality.

On the other hand one can no longer say that freedom is more important than equality for all categories covered by the survey.

TABLE 1.1.2

## THE CHOICG BEIWERN LIBERRIY AND EQUALITY

|  | Liberty | Equality | Neither | No <br> reply | TOTAL |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aggregate | 44 | 44 | 8 | 4 | 100 |

Ehucatianal level

| Low | 39 | 47 | 7 | 7 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Medium | 47 | 42 | 8 | 3 | 100 |
| Advanced | 51 | 38 | 8 | 3 | 100 |

## Level of income

| Low - - | 40 | 45 | 9 | 6 | 100 |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| - | 43 | 46 | 7 | 4 | 100 |
| + | 41 | 49 | 7 | 3 | 100 |
| $H 1 g h++$ | 52 | 40 | 6 | 2 | 100 |

Political alleqiance

| Extreme left $(1-2)$ | 28 | 61 | 7 | 4 | 100 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $(3-4)$ | 40 | 49 | 8 | 3 | 100 |
| $(5-6)$ | 57 | 42 | 7 | 4 | 100 |
| $(7-8)$ | 53 | 37 | 7 | 3 | 100 |
| Extreme right $(9-10)$ | 56 | 34 | 7 | 3 | 100 |

1 "Les Valeurs du temps présent" - Jean Stoetzel, p. 50.

### 1.1.3. Attitories to maist and anti-racist mopements

Question: There are movements and organizations which have a particular point of view about foreign inmigration. For each of the following could you tell me if you approve completely, to same extent, or disapprove to some extent or completely?

|  | APPROVE |  | DISAPPROVE |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { No } \\ \text { reply } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total } \\ & \text { EC } 12 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Completely | To some extent | Completely | To same extent |  |  |
| Movements in <br> favour of racism | 4 | 6 |  | 63 | 8 | 100 |
| Movements opposed to racism | $47$ | 24 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 100 |

Before we analyse the answers we should make two comments regarding the way in which the question was formulated. On the one hand a complex scale of answers is used: it presupposes that in order to give a cohereint answer the respondent first approves then disapproves, or vice-versa. We shall see that the two answers given by one and the same person can at times seem contradictory. This may be due to the way questions and answers are structured, but it should also be remembered that the question relates to foreign immigrants, an issue with considerable emotional resonance. The answers given should be seen in that context.

In Europe, and in each Member State, one in ten respomdents olaims to approve of racist movements, or, to be more precise, of the position of racist organizations with regard to inmigration; whereas eight in ten are against. Only one country gives below average support to raotst movements, i.e. Greece, where only $4 \%$ of respondents are more or less in favour of racist movements. Moreover, while seven out of ten Europeans approve of anti-racist movements, one in five is against such movements.

The graph on the following page shows that there is correlation for each country between disapproval of racist movements and approval of anti-racist movements. The identity of the Member State would therefore appear to be a highly significant variable with regard to opinions on racist and anti-racist movements. One might suggest that the variations from one country to another are due to the differences in political and organizational amenities available in each country (correlation coefficient $=-0.86$ ).

## DISAPPROVAL OF RACIST MOVEMENTS

AND APPROVAL OF ANTI-RACIST MOVEMENTS; BY COUNTRY


Interestingly, the countries on the bottom right-hand side of the graph Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom - are the four Member States with the highest numbers of imnigrants. By contrast, the southern Member States - Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal - all countries with a strong emigration tradition, and the Netherlands, which has adopted a particularly liberal attitude to inmigrants, are found at the opposite end of the graph.

Here again age and sex are not particularly significant variables; educational level, level of income, leadership, a tendency towards post-materialism, and political allegiance on the other hand, are relevant factors. We should nevertheless point out that even among the most educated, post-materialists and people who think of themselves as being left wing there is always a minimum percentage of $7 \%$ who more or less approve of racist movements. National pride does not seem to play much of a part in opinions expressed about these two types of movement, nor does the sort of area in which one lives, although, given that immigrant populations tend to be found mainly in urban areas, one would have expected this to be a socio-demographic factor favouring greater discrimination.
Approval
of racist $\quad$ of anti-raaist
movements movements

## Type of area

- Village
1.501
$3.10^{1}$
- Small town
1.45
3.19
- Big city
1.44
3.26

If we combine the answers to the two questions we obtain the following:

|  | RACIST MOVEMENTS |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Anti-racist <br> movements | In favour | Against | Don't know |
| In favour | $2 \%$ | $68 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Against | $7 \%$ | $13 \%$ | - |
| Don't know | - | $2 \%$ | $7 \%$ |

1 Calculated on the basis of a coefficient of 4 having been attributed to the answer "approve completely", 3 to "approve to some extent", 2 to "disapprove to some extent" and 1 to "disapprove completely"

Seven out of ten Europeans then, disapprove of racist movements and approve of movements against racism. This typology enables us to identify a category of Europeans who disapprove of either organization (racist or anti-racist), i.e. people who are opposed to racism but who stop short of accepting or supporting the activities of organizations actively opposed to racism. This category of people is significantly larger in Belgium ( $22 \%$ ), Germany (19\%), France (23\%) and the United Kingdom (15\%). It is virtually non-existent in Greece (O\%), Spain (2\%), Italy (4\%) and in Portugal (4\%).

Analysis shows that people who disapprove of both movements do not clearly distinguish themselves from the rest of the population, in particular as regards the more or less intangible nature of freedom of associationl. It could be that these people, although opposed to racist movements as such, subscribe to the more traditional view that strangers in general and immigrants in particular should not be involved in politics (principle of neutrality, restriction of the right of association ...)2.

Also, what people feel about these movements is related to the way they feel about democracy.

| Democracy | Dictatorship | No | No |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| always | Nometimes | difference |  |
| reply |  |  |  |

Approve of racist morements
-- Approve of antiracist movements

66
13
18
3100

- Disapprove of antiracist movements

62
14
23
$1 \quad 100$
Disapprove of racist movements

| - Approve of antiracist movements | 82 | 8 | 9 | 1 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - Disapprove of antiracist movements | 74 | 12 | 13 | 1 | 100 |
| Aggregate | 78 | 9 | 12 | 1 | 100 |

[^2]TABIR 1.1 .3 OPINIONS ON RAGIST AND ANII-RACIST MDVEMRNIS

## Agenegrate

| Approve | Approve |
| :--- | :--- |
| Racist | Anti-raaist |
| movements | movements |
| (indicators)l | (indicators)l |

## Educational Ievel

| Low | 1.51 | 3.14 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Average | 1.48 | 3.14 |
| Advanced | 1.33 | 3.33 |

Ievel of income

| Heak - - | 1.51 | 3.19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - | 1.50 | 3.10 |
| + | 1.44 | 3.18 |
| High + + | 1.40 | 3.25 |

Leadenship

| Strong + + | 1.34 | 3.27 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| + | 1.43 | 3.22 |
| Weak -+ | 1.49 | 3.17 |
|  | 1.55 | 3.08 |

Post-materialism rating

| Materialist | 1.56 | 3.07 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Mixed | 1.46 | 3.16 |
| Post-materialist | 1.32 | 3.41 |

Political allegiance

| Extreme left $(1-2)$ | 1.36 | 3.48 |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $(3-4)$ | 1.37 | 3.38 |
|  | $(5-6)$ | 1.47 | 3.14 |
| $(7-8)$ | 1.55 | 2.94 |  |
| Extreme right $(9-10)$ | 1.64 | 2.88 |  |

## National mider ${ }^{2}$

| Very proud | 1.48 | 3.10 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rather proud | 1.49 | 3.09 |
| No so proud | 1.44 | 3.17 |
| Not proud at a.ll | 1.33 | 3.18 |

1 The higher the rating the stronger the approval. See page 18 for the way in which this rating is calculated.
2 Question: Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to be (nationality)?

### 1.2. Europeans and their views an, and knowledge of, mman rights

### 1.2.1. Commitment to human rights

A list of human rights, largely based on the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was shown to respondents. It also covers cultural, social and political rights.

Question: For each of the following rights and liberties of man, can you tell me if in general you think that they should always be respected under a.ll circumstances or does it depend on the situation?

|  | Always | It depends | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No } \\ & \text { reply } \end{aligned}$ | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The right to education and training | 94 | 4 | 2 | 100 |
| The right to privacy | 91 | 6 | 3 | 100 |
| The right to work | 90 | 8 | 2 | 100 |
| Equality before the law | 87 | 10 | 3 | 100 |
| The right to personal safety and protection | 84 | 11 | 5 | 100 |
| Religious freedom and freedom of conscience | 83 | 14 | 3 | 100 |
| Freedom of information | 82 | 15 | 3 | 100 |
| The right to own property | 80 | 17 | 3 | 100 |
| The right of people to their own language and culture | 79 | 18 | 3 | 100 |
| Freedom of speech | 77 | 21 | 2 | 100 |
| Freedom of association | 60 | 33 | 7 | 100 |
| The right to asylum | 51 | 42 | 7 | 100 |

The first interesting point is that we do not find the "traditional" rig'hts, such as freedom of speech or association, or the rig'ht to own property at the top of the list. What is more, most important rights according to the people interviewed - directly concern access to work, either through education or through the right to a paid job: the scarcer a commodity the higher its price.

Traditional rights after all, are sufficientily recognized and guaranteed in the Member States, while there is deep concern about employment, which is reflected in the answers given here: in countries with lower unemployment rates the right to work is less often mentioned as a right that should always be respected.

In second place we find the right to privacy: this is a complex and recent right, and its popularity may be related to what sociologists describe as "cocooning". The rights particularly appreciated by Europeans tend to fit into a private and day-to-day framework. People are least concerned about the one collective right mentioned in the question, i.e. the right to freedom of association.

The right to asylum, finally, which is of particular significance to this study, is considered as the least absolute.

Although there are considerable variations between individual countries, a certain number of similarities should be pointed out: at the top of the list in almost every country we find equality before the law, the right to work (except in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands), the right to education and the right to privacy. At the bottom of the list we find freedom of association and the right to asylum (see Table overleaf).

TABLE 1.2.1.

HUMAN RIGHTS THAT SHOULD ALMAYS BE RESPBCTED
UNDER ALL CTRCMMSTANGES


## TABIE 1.2.1. (CONITNUED)

## HIMAAN RIGHIS THAT SHOUTD ALWAYS BE RESPEGCIKD <br> ONDER ALU GIRCTRSTANGES

| IRELAND |  | ITALY |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | IUXEMBOURG |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \| Training | 97 | Work | 97 | Training | 961 |
| \| Work | 94 | Equality | 96 | Privacy | 961 |
| \| Personal safety | 93 | Training | 96 | Equality | 961 |
| \| Language, culture | 89 | Privacy | 94 | Woris | 94 |
| \| Religion | 87 | Information | 90 | Information | 94 |
| \| Privacy | 87 | Personal safety | 88 | Property | 91 |
| \| Property | 82 | Religion | 88 | Personal safety | 891 |
| Information | 71 | Language, culture | 88 | Religion | 87 |
| \| Equality | 70 | Property | 76 | Language, culture | 85 |
| \| Free speech | 69 | Free speech | 75 | Free speech | 84 |
| \| Association | 56 | Association | 57 | Assoctation | 55 |
| \| Asylum | 46 | Asylum | 50 | Asyium | 551 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 THE NEIHERIANDS |  | PORIUGAL |  | UNIIED KINGDOM |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| \| Training | 93 | Woris | 91 | Training | 95 |
| \| Privacy | 92 | Training | 89 | Personal safety | 91 \| |
| \| Relligion | 89 | Information | 88 | Work | 87 |
| \| Equality | 86 | Ianguage, culture | 87 | Privacy | 86 |
| \| Work | 80 | Equality | 86 | Property | 80 |
| \| Personal safety | 80 | Personal safety | 86 | Religion | 771 |
| \| Information | 74 | Privacy | 84 | Free speech | 66 |
| \| Free speech | 73 | Religion | 83 | Equality | 65 |
| \| Property | 67 | Property | 79 | Language, culture | 63 |
| \| Language, culture | 63 | Free speech | 73 | Association | 62 |
| \| Association | 56 | Asylum | 67 | Information | 60 |
| \| Asylum | 25 | Association | 67 | Asylum | 371 |

Two socio-political variables seem to influence: the leadership factor and people's perception of their position in the political spectrum (i.e. between left and right).

For most of the rights mentioned (with the exception of the rights to privacy, work and one's own culture), the higher one's leadership rating', the more one is inclined to consider that such rights should be inviolate.

For all the rights mentioned it appears that the further to the right one is politically, the more one is inclined to accept restrictions on these rights.

There is one exception to this rule, and that is the right to property, which is considered more absolute on the right than it is on the left. People with a high leadership rating and those with a high level of education furthermore tend to be more inclined to restriot that right. Other variables do not play a major part.

### 1.2.2. Knowledge of basic texts relating to human rights

The texts and declarations relating to human rights were chosen from a list of contemporary documents.

Question: Here is a list of documents which have the objectives of affirming human rights and the rights of the citizen. Have you heard of any of them? If so, which ones?
The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights of
Results EC 12
1948

Europeans are thus divided into two major groups of roughly equal size: those who have never heard of any of these texts, and those who know at least the UN Declaration. More than one European in four has heard of the Council of Europe Convention, and nearly one in five has heard of the Joint Declaration.

[^3]The table below shows that people who say they know at least one of these texts, often know one of the others as well:

| WN | Convention | EEC No | Aggregate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Declaration | of the | Declaration reply |  |
|  | Coumatl of Burope |  |  |


| UN Declaration | 100 | 75 | 72 | - | 47 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Convention of the <br> Council of Europe | 41 | 100 | 53 | - | 26 |
| EFC Declaration | 26 | 35 | 100 | - | 17 |
| No reply | - | - | - | 100 | 45 |

The extent to which people are aware of the existence of these texts varies considerably from country to country: it is much greater in Denmaris, the Netherlands, France and Spain, than it is in Greece or Portugal.

## Average mumber of texts known <br> per country <br> (in descending order)

- Danmark
1.33
- Nederland
1.28
- France
1.12
- España
1.05
- Luxembourg
0.99


## Average EC 12

0.90

- United Kingdom
0.86
- Italia
0.82
- Belgique
0.79
. Deutschland
0.76
- Ireland
0.60
- Ellas
0.52
- Portugal
0.49

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF BASIC TEXTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS - PER COUNTRY


The answers to this question are to a large extent determined by cognitive variables, such as level of education and leadership. The cut-off that we see after the age of 55 can probably be explained by recent improvements in educational levels.

Variables such as the post-materialism indicator and political allegiance also play their part (see Table overleaf). The more one tends towards post-materialism, the better one's knowledge of basic texts on human rights.

On the other hand it is debatable whether knowledge of such texts and unconditional support of human rights always go hand in hand. People with a high level of awareness of basic human rights are very much less inolined to admit restrictions on the exercise of rights such as freedom of association, the right to one's own language and culture, religious freedom and freedom of expression, equality before the law, the right to asylum and the right to information.

Question: For each of the following rights and liberties of man, can you tell me if they should always be respected under all circumstances?

Number of texts heard of
None One Two Three Aggregate

## \% of "always" answers

. Freedom of speech
. The right to personal safety and protection

| 76 | 75 | 80 | 80 | 77 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 83 | 83 | 87 | 91 | 85 |
| 57 | 61 | 62 | 75 | 61 |
| 77 | 80 | 82 | 86 | 79 |
| 80 | 83 | 85 | 91 | 83 |
| 86 | 87 | 89 | 95 | 88 |
| 48 | 52 | 54 | 64 | 51 |
| 90 | 91 | 90 | 92 | 90 |
| 81 | 79 | 77 | 80 | 80 |
| 92 | 95 | 96 | 96 | 94 |
| 81 | 81 | 85 | 92 | 93 |
| 91 | 92 | 93 | 93 | 92 |

TABLB 1.1 .1

## EXITRNT TO WHICH HIDAN RIGHIS TEXXIS ARE KNOMN

| $\begin{gathered} \text { UN } \\ \text { Declaration } \end{gathered}$ | C of Bur Conv | $\begin{gathered} \text { EBC } \\ \text { Declaration } \end{gathered}$ | No reply | Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 47 | 26 | 17 | 45 | 0.9 |

## Agg Sex

| Male | 54 | 30 | 19 | 39 | 1.02 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Female | 41 | 22 | 16 | 49 | 0.79 |

Age

| $15-24$ | 5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $25-39$ | 5 |
| $40-54$ | 48 |

55 and over
54
48
39
26
18
39
0.95
$27 \quad 19 \quad 39 \quad 0.99$
$28 \quad 17 \quad 43 \quad 0.93$

| 23 | 15 | 54 | 0.77 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## Fducations1 Ievel

| Low |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Medium | 30 |

50
20
13
88
0.65

Medium
72
25
41
18
40
0.93

Advanced
23
23
1.36

Leadersihip


72
41
26
23
1.39

31
23
15
15
35
1.08

40
40
9
62
0.78

Post-materialism

| Materialist | 36 | 19 | 15 | 57 | 0.69 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Mixed | 50 | 27 | 17 | 41 | 0.94 |
| Post-materialist | 62 | 35 | 22 | 31 | 1.18 |

Politioal allegiance

| Extreme left | $(1-2)$ | 59 | 32 | 25 | 33 | 1.16 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $(3-4)$ | 55 | 28 | 19 | 38 | 1.02 |
|  | $(5-6)$ | 46 | 28 | 17 | 44 | 0.91 |
|  | $(7-8)$ | 47 | 24 | 15 | 45 | 0.87 |
| Extreme right $(9-10)$ | 47 | 25 | 16 | 44 | 0.88 |  |

### 1.2.3. Assessment of Community policy on the protection of human rights Question: Do you think that the European institutions are sufficiently active in protecting human rights, or that they are not sufficiently active?

## EC 12

| - Sufficiently active | 27 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Not sufficiently active | 48 |
| No reply | 25 |
| TOTAL | 100 |

Nearly one out of every two Europeans is not satisfied with the action taken by the European Institutions on human rights. A good 25\% of those questioned belleves that the Communities do not do enough, while a considerable proportion has no opinion on the matter.

Opinions are a little more positive in Belgium and the Netherlands, where $33 \%$ believe that the Community Institutions are doing enough.

The number of people with no particular views on the matter is considerable: more than four out of ten in Greece and Portugal, and one in three in Dermark and the Netherlands.

Critical views tend to be more expressed by people with a certain level of education, leaders and those who consider themselves to be left wing.

There seems to be no particular link between the level of awareness of basic documents on the one hand and views on Community policy on human rights on the other. Nor do opinions on this particular aspect of European policy seem to be linked to opinions expressed on the Conmunity in general.


## TABLE 1.2.3.

## ASSESSSMENT OF EUROPEAN POLICY ON HIMAN RICREIS

## Suffiaiently Not sufficiently No TONAL active active reply

 27 48 25 100 Agrinetate Sex| Male | 31 | 48 | 21 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Female | 23 | 48 | 29 | 100 |

Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
55 and over
Ftuartional level

| Low | 26 | 42 | 32 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Medium | 28 | 61 | 21 | 100 |
| Advanced | 24 | 58 | 18 | 100 |
| Leadership |  |  |  |  |
| Strong + + | 29 | 58 | 13 | 100 |
| + | 29 | 52 | 19 | 100 |
| - | 28 | 47 | 25 | 100 |
| Weak - - | 20 | 40 | 40 | 100 |

Post-materialism

| Materialist | 30 | 39 | 31 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Mixed | 27 | 50 | 23 | 100 |
| Post-materialist | 20 | 62 | 18 | 100 |

Politiog 1 allegianoe

| Extreme left | $(1-2)$ | 20 | 64 | 16 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $(3-4)$ | 24 | 56 | 20 | 100 |
|  | $(5-6)$ | 28 | 47 | 25 | 100 |
| $(7-8)$ | 34 | 43 | 23 | 100 |  |
| Extreme right $(9-10)$ | 34 | 42 | 24 | 100 |  |

## CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN ATITITUES TO AND OPINIONS ABOUT "OTHERS"

For the purpose of this study, "OIHERS" should be seen in general terms: their "otherness" can be their nationality, race, religion, culture or social class.

For each of these categories one open question was put, to find out who these "Others" are in European eyes.

This is followed by a list of questions aimed at getting a clear picture of the perception Europeans have of the presence of these different ategories of people, and on the contacts they have with them in daily life. Finally, respondents were asked to react to a number of typioal value judgments and well known aliches about these people.

### 2.1. Who are these "OTHERR"?

"Otherness", then, has been defined in terms of nationality, race, religion, culture and social class, in that order. Those are also the criteria applied by the inter-Institutional Declaration of 1986 against racism and xenophobia. For each of these categories the same question was put: "When you hear about people of another nationality/race/religion/ culture/social class, whom do You think of?". The answers were later encoded into broad categories. The results are given on the following pages. A mumber of conclusions can be drawn from them:

With regard to nationality as an issue, European countries can be divided into a mumber of groups:

[^4]With refard to the "other race" the most common spontaneous answer in all European countries except France and the United Kingdom associates this with the black race. In France it tends to be Arabs, whereas in the United Kingdom the association usually refers to Indians.

The inclination among respondents to mention a particular type of population, moreover, varies considerably from one country to another.

The "other religion" at a Community level is clearly Islam. It is mentioned by more than half the respondents in Belgium and France, and by more than seven out of ten people in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Ireland is an exception here: for six out of ten people "others" are Protestants. In the other countries there is a fairly wide spread (particularly in the United Kingdom, Italy and Greece), while in Spain and Portugal in particular more people found it hard to answer this question.

The problems experienced in defining "other culture" has led to answers broadly based on the preceding three categories.

When it comes to "the other social class", the pattern clearly changes; most respondents mention the rich, the upper classes or the poor.

TABLE 2.1.1

Question: When you hear about people of another nationality, whom do you think of?


## (Spontaneous answers)

. Southern Europeans

- Eastern Europeans
- Other Europeans
. North Africans
- Africans
- Asians - Far East
- Asians - Middle East
- Other Asians
. Turks
- North Americans
- Central Americans
- Latin Americans

D GR
E $\quad \mathbf{F}$
IRL I
$\mathbf{L} \quad \mathbf{N} \quad \mathbf{P}$
UK
x 12

- Oceaneans
. All foreigners, non-nationals
Immigrants, refugees
- Other
- Nobody in particular

| 20 | 2 | 26 | 3 | 8 | 10 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 4 | 5 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 21 | 11 | 10 | 23 | 37 | 11 |
| 32 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 55 |
| 6 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| 2 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 1 | 43 | 6 | 4 | - | 1 |
| 1 | 17 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 23 | 37 | 63 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| 4 | 3 | 5 | 16 | 9 | 3 |
| 1 | - | 0 | - | 1 | - |
| - | - | - | - | 6 | - |
| - | - | - | 1 | - | 0 |
| 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 4 | - | - | - |
| 9 | 5 | 4 | 15 | 9 | 5 |
| 7 | 5 | 3 | 12 | 15 | 6 |


| 6 | 2 | 67 | 17 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 3 | 8 | 1 | 6 |
| 57 | 25 | 19 | 12 |
| 1 | 20 | 1 | 55 |
| 12 | 16 | 1 | 1 |
| 6 | 4 | 0 | 17 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 5 | 1 | 0 | 13 |
| 0 | - | 0 | 73 |
| 22 | 20 | 1 | 2 |
| - | 0 | - | 37 |
| - | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 3 | - | - | - |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | - | - | 7 |
| 0 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| 9 | 8 | 8 | 3 | No reply

## TABIE 2.1.2

Question: When you hear about people of another race, whom do you think of?


## (Spontaneous answers)

- Whites
- Blacks
. Orientals (yellow race)
- Gypsies
- Arabs

Turks

- Indians

Indonesians, Malaysians
Other
Nobody in particular No reply

| 1 | 0 | - | 7 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 53 | 39 | 63 | 47 | 62 | 29 | 54 | 63 | 69 | 57 | 61 | 32 | 50 |
| 12 | 17 | 25 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 26 | 5 | 7 | 14 |
| - | 0 | - | 1 | 3 | - | - | 1 | 0 | - | 3 | - | 1 |
| 28 | 22 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 39 | 4 | 11 | 3 | 17 | - | 2 | 12 |
| 11 | 11 | 10 | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | 0 | 19 | - | 1 | 4 |
| 1 | 11 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 3 | - | 6 | 2 | 41 | 11 |
| - | 2 | 1 | 0 | - | - | 3 | 1 | 0 | 7 | - | - | 1 |
| 4 | 9 | 8 | 1 | - | 1 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| 2 | 6 | 2 | 15 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 4 |
| 11 | 6 | 6 | 154 | 13 | 7 | 4 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 14 | 14 | 10 |

## TABLE 2.1.3

Question: When you hear about people of another religion, whom do you think of?

## (Spontaneous answers)

. Catholics
Protestants
Church of England

- Orthodox

Jews
. Maslims

- Budhists
- Hindus
- Jehovah's witnesses/

Christian scientists
Moonies, other sects
Other
Nobody in particular No reply

B DK D GR E F
IRL I
$\mathbf{L}$
NL
L. P

P UK $\qquad$ EC 12

TABLE 2.1.4

Question: When you hear about people of another culture, wham do you think of?

## (Spontancous answers)

- Southern Europeans
- East Europeans
- Other Europeans
. North Africans
- Africans
- Asians - Far East
- Asians - Middle East
- Other Asians
- Turks
- North Americans
- Central Americans
. Latin Americans
. Blacks
. Orientals (yellow race)
- Catholics
- Protestants

Muslims

- Jews
. Budhists, Hindus
- Gypsies

Nobody in particular
Other
No reply

B DK D

3

| 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 19 | 7 | 2 | - | 8 | 15 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 25 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| 6 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 9 | 8 | 21 | 1 | 9 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 8 | 15 | 7 | 40 | 19 |
| 1 | 22 | 7 | - | 3 | 1 | 2 | - | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 2 | 8 | 12 | 3 | 1 | - | 10 | 4 | 14 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| 7 | 16 | 24 | - | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| 2 | - | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 1 | - | 1 |
| 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | - | - | 3 | 2 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 8 | 9 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | 7 | 2 |
| 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | - |
| 1 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | 0 | - |
| 15 | 16 | 7 | - | 1 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | - | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | 1 |
| 2 | 3 | 2 | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 | - | 4 | 2 |
| 0 | 1 | - | - | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 4 | - | 1 |
| 0 | 9 | 4 | 28 | 10 | 5 | 15 | 8 | - | 6 | 12 | 9 | 7 |
| 9 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 20 | 17 | 5 |
| 22 | 12 | 18 | 51 | 49 | 33 | 7 | 42 | 46 | 14 | 41 | 20 | 29 |

TABLE 2.1 .5

Question: When you hear about people of another social class, whom do you think of?

## (Spontaneous answers)

The poor
. People on benefits, the unemployed

- People with little education

Manual workers
The rich
. Alcoholics, drug users

- Dropouts

Immigrants

- Other foreigners

The lower classes
. The middle classes

- The upper classes
- Retired people, the old
- Third World people
- Intellectuals
- Travellers
. Other
None
No reply

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.
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### 2.2. The divensity of society as perceityed by Furopeans

The human diversity in Europe has been considered from two angles: the way Europeans perceive that diversity in their country in general, and the way they perceive it in daily Iife.

### 2.2.1. Perception of hman diversity in ome's country

The criteria (nationality, race, religion, culture and social class) are the same as in the previous question:
Question: "Generally speaking, how do you feel about the mumber of
people of another (nationality/race/religion/culture/
social class) Ilving in our country: are there too many,
many but not too many, or not many?"
. Other nationality

- Other race 33
. Other religion
- Other culture
. Other social class

| Too | Many | Not many | No |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| many | but not |  |  |
|  | too many |  |  |$\quad$ reply

At Community level most people concurred that there was a considerable human diversity, more so in terms of nationality, race and religion. It is true to say that for the other two criteria - culture and social class the open questions showed that these two concepts remain rather vague in people's minds and produce high rates of blank answers. One European in three believes that there are too many people of another nationality or race in his country.

To get a clear idea of how Europeans really feel about "others", a breakdown of the groups considered too large and of the strongest views held on them is revealing.

STRONGEST VIENS EXPRESSED
ON "OTHERS"


BREAKDONN OF GROUPS CONSIDERED TOO NUMEROUS


The diagram on the left suggests that one European in two feels that some groups of "others" are too large. The diagram on the right, which gives the breakdown of the numbers of categories to whom this applies, shows that this type of opinion is fairly consistent, in that large minorities of Europeans mention more than one group in their country as being too lange.

The perception of human diversity, however, varies considerably from one country to another. On the following page we find a graph giving the percentage of people who answered "too many", by population oategory and by country. A clear separation emerges between Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy) and Ireland on the one hand, and the other countries of the Community on the other: this appears to be not so much a north-south division, as a reflection of different traditions in terms of history and migration between countries with a longstanding tradition of emigration and those with considerable inmigrant populations on their territories, whose presence is liniked to a colonial past.






ロ





NL

Opinions expressed on the size of foreign populations in one's own oountry seem to be closely linked to the presence of non-EECC nationals in the countries concerned (correlation rate $=0.82$ ). It should be noted that the figures used extemate the significance of the correlation for at least two countries, i.e. the United Kingdom - where many people who originally came from India or Pakistan now have British nationality - and Italy, where the necessary immigration statistics are not always available.

## RETAIIONSHIP BEINEFEN THE NUNBERS OF NOK-EECC NATIONALS

IN THEB COUNIRY AS PERGEIVED BY RESSPONDENIS AND IN RRAL TKRRMS


1 Documents Observateur - L'Europe multi-raciale, No 4 janvier/fevrier 1989, p. 18-19. Sources: EEC, SOPEMI-OECD, IRAD. See Annex for more details on statistics used.

For an analysis of socio-political variables a distinction has to be made between opinions expressed on "others" in terms race, nationality, religion and culture on the one hand, and what people say about people of another social class on the other, because these variables turn out to be rather undiscerning for the latter category.

In contrast to the first four categories a mumber of major variations are revealed. Although sex does not seem to be a factor, advanaing age goes hand in hand with a growing inclination to think that there are too many "others". The educational level, leadership rating, tendency towards post-materialism and left wing leanings are all variables which correspond to more moderate answers with regard to the presence of "others".

These characteristics of socio-political variables have led to the construction of an index which only takes into account nationality, race and rellgion. It also limits itself to cases where the answer was "too many".

> Number of groups of persons from another category
> (nationality - race - religion)
> of whom respondents feel that there are "too many"

| - None | $57 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| - One | 12 |
| Two | 17 |
| Three | 14 |
| TOTAL | 100 |

There is a correlation between a strong sense of national pride and a feeling that "there are too many foreigners around".

## Sense of national pride

| Very | Rather | Not so | Not | No | Aggregate |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| proud | proud | proud | proud | reply |  |

Other nationality there are:

| - too many | 42 | 37 | 35 | 26 | 19 | 37 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - many but not too many | 36 | 44 | 44 | 47 | 49 | 41 |
| - not many | 16 | 15 | 18 | 23 | 22 | 17 |
| No reply | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Other race -
there are:
$\begin{array}{lllllll}- \text { too many } & 37 & 33 & 31 & 22 & 14 & 33\end{array}$

- many but not too many
- not many No reply Total

| 34 | 41 | 41 | 39 | 43 | 39 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 22 | 21 | 25 | 32 | 32 | 23 |
| 7 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 11 | 5 |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

The level of satisfaction regarding life today or in the near future does not seem to be linked with the perception of the various categories as defined here. The link with opinions expressed on racist movements, although not strong, is significant: only those respondents who disapprove completely of this type of movement are in a majcrity when it comes to stating that they do not think that there are too many people of another nationality or race in their country.

## Opinion on racist movements



TABLE 2.2.1.

OPINION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY

|  | SEX |  | A6E |  |  |  | LEVEL OF EDUCATION |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MALE | FEMALE | 15-24 YRS | 25-39 YRS | 40-54 | 55 YRS <br> AND OVER | LOW | MEDIUM | ADVANCED |
| OTHER NATIONALITY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Too many | 37 | 38 | 32 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 42 | 41 |  |
| - Not too many | 41 | 42 | 45 | 42 | 41 | 38 | 42 34 | 42 | 22 54 |
| - Not many | 18 | 15 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 16 | 14 | 22 |
| OTHER RACE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Too many | 33 | 34 | 28 | 30 | 34 | 39 | 37 | 36 | 20 |
| - Not too many | 38 | 39 | 43 | 40 | 36 | 37 | 33 | 41 | 46 |
| - Not many | 25 | 21 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 18 | 22 | 20 | 30 |
| OTHER RELIGION |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Too many. ... | 18 | 20 | 14 | 18 | 20 | 22 | 23 | 19 | 12 |
| - Not too many | 39 | 42 | 43 | 40 | 41 | 39 | 36 | 44 | 44 |
| - Not many | 33 | 27 | 33 | 32 | 29 | 25 | 28 | 27 | 36 |
| OTHER CLLTURE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Too many..... | 20 | 20 | 16 | 18 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 22 | 13 |
| - Not too many | 38 | 39 | 42 | 38 | 36 | 39 | 32 | 42 | 44 |
| - Not many | 32 | 27 | 33 | 35 | 31 | 23 | 29 | 28 | 35 |
| OTHER SOCIAL CLASS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Too many . . . . | 20 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 21 | 22 |  |  |
| Not too many Not many | 37 | 41 | 42 | 38 | 40 | 37 | 35 | 42 | 41 |
|  | 30 | 23 | 25 | 28 | 26 | 29 | 26 | 26 | 27 |

## TABLE 2.2.1. (CONTINUED)

OPINION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY


### 2.2.2. Perception of human diversity in daily life

"Daily life" has been approached from three angles: the neighbourhood, the workplace and friends.

Question: "From this list, I would like you to tell me if there are many such people, a few, or none, who live in your neighbourhood? Are there many such people among your friends? Are there many such people who work with you?

## Many Some None Unspec- Total ified

In the neighbourhood

| Persons of another nationality | 9 | 43 | 47 | 1 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| race | 8 | 37 | 54 | 1 | 100 |
| religion | 12 | 46 | 40 | 2 | 100 |
| culture | 8 | 39 | 52 | 1 | 100 |
| social class | 11 | 45 | 43 | 1 | 100 |
| Among friends |  |  |  |  |  |
| Persons of another nationality | 5 | 35 | 60 | - | 100 |
| race | 3 | 26 | 71 | - | 100 |
| religion | 6 | 36 | 57 | 1 | 100 |
| culture | 4 | 28 | 67 | 1 | 100 |
| social class | 6 | 38 | 55 | 1 | 100 |
| At work |  |  |  |  |  |
| Persons of another nationality | 5 | 26 | 65 | 4 | 100 |
| race | 4 | 21 | 70 | 5 | 100 |
| religion | 7 | 31 | 57 | 5 | 100 |
| culture | 4 | 24 | 68 | 4 | 100 |
| social class | 6 | 30 | 60 | 4 | 100 |

There is a clear contrast between what people feel about the presence of "others" in their country, and the extent to which they mix with those "others" in daily life. At Member State level the dominant response tends to be "many". In daily life there is a tendency to reply "same" or "none".

This contrast can be narrowed down by category of person: the largest numbers of "other" people in the country are considered to be those of another nationality or another race. In daily life, the "other person" tends to be of another religion or another culture.

The temuous link between the answers given to these questions respectively is illustrated by the table given below, which takes into acoount the number of answeres given as "many", "some", "none" for persons for another nationality, race or religion.

Proximity indicator: categories of people met in the neighbourhood, at the workplace or as friends

| Number of categories | "Many" | "Many" | Some" | "Some" | None | gregate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| of persons | (at least | (at least | (at least | (at 1 |  |  |
| considered to be | three | once) | three | once) |  |  |
| present in excessive | times) |  | times) |  |  |  |
| numbers (race, nationality, religion) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| None | 43 | 52 | 58 | 59 | 59 | 57 |
| . One | 7 | 15 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| . Two | 21 | 22 | 16 | 18 | 15 | 17 |
| . Three | 29 | 11 | 16 | 10 | 16 | 14 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Average | 1.35 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.76 | 0.90 | 0.90 |

## Significance of the different grouns in the neighbourhood

This varies considerably from country to country and from group to group. Thus, the presence of persons of another nationality in the neighbourhood is higher in Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. More than six southern Europeans out of ten, on the other hand (Greeks, Spanish, Italians, Portuguese) do not know a single foreigner in their neighbourhood.

Generally speaking, on the basis of these answers human diversity in a neighbourhood context would seem to be greatest in the Netherlands, France and Belgium.

Whereas sex is still no significant variable here, age above 55 goes hand in hand with less contact with the different groups. The level of education, on the other hand (and to a lesser extent, the level of income), leadership tendencies and a post-materialist attitude seem to correspond to a more diversified human emvironment. Political allegiance pays no part here.

Very considerable variations are noted, depending on the type of Community, which probably goes some way towards explaining the above observations.

|  | village | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Small } \\ & \text { town } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Big } \\ & \text { Town } \end{aligned}$ | Aggregate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aggregate | 35 | 37 | 28 | 100 |
| Other natiomality |  |  |  |  |
| . Many | 15 | 37 | 48 | 100 |
| . Some | 27 | 38 | 35 | 100 |
| . None | 47 | 35 | 18 | 100 |
| Other race |  |  |  |  |
| Many | 12 | 36 | 52 | 100 |
| Some | 25 | 38 | 37 | 100 |
| None | 46 | 35 | 19 | 100 |
| Other religion |  |  |  |  |
| . Many | 20 | 35 | 45 | 100 |
| - Same | 31 | 38 | 31 | 100 |
| . None | 47 | 34 | 19 | 100 |
| Other culture |  |  |  |  |
| . Many | 12 | 36 | 52 | 100 |
| . Some | 27 | 38 | 35 | 100 |
| . None | 46 | 35 | 19 | 100 |
| Other social class |  |  |  |  |
| . Many | 23 | 35 | 42 | 100 |
| - Some | 31 | 36 | 33 | 100 |
| None | 43 | 37 | 20 | 100 |

## Significance of the various groups amons friends

Regardless of the nature of the group, at least six out of ten Europeans claim that none of their friends belong to these groups. It seems that in the Netherlands and in France - the "other person" is often part of the circle of friends, more so than in other countries.

The impact of socio-political variables is rather different from what
it is in relation to previous questions: whereas the level of education, leadership rating and a tendency towards post-materialism seem to determine closer friendly links with persons belonging to other groups, a more right-wing political allegiance goes hand in hand with a lower level of acceptance of "other people" as friends where these are of a different nationality or race.

## Signifiasnce of the different groups at the work place

On average one European in three has occupational contact with a person of a different nationality (two out of three, in Iuxembourg). This proportion goes down to one out of four where people of another race are concerned. Here again, the Netherlands, France and also the United Kingdom return higher figures. The effect of socio-political variables is the same as that observed for neighbourhoods.

TABLE 2.2.2
Significance of the various catbgories in the neighbourhood

OIHER NATIONALITY
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER RACE
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody

## OIHER RELIGION

. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER CULTURE
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER SOCLAL CLASS
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody

| B | DK | D | GR | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | P | UK | BC 12 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | 12 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 18 | 2 | 4 | 27 | 18 | 1 | 9 | 9 |
| 55 | 50 | 49 | 27 | 33 | 42 | 45 | 33 | 55 | 50 | 29 | 55 | 43 |
| 24 | 38 | 44 | 68 | 62 | 39 | 53 | 63 | 18 | 29 | 70 | 36 | 47 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 9 | 8 |
| 52 | 46 | 33 | 20 | 30 | 39 | 25 | 27 | 32 | 49 | 35 | 54 | 37 |
| 35 | 44 | 63 | 75 | 65 | 44 | 74 | 69 | 62 | 31 | 63 | 37 | 54 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 | 11 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 17 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 27 | 3 | 18 | 12 |
| 50 | 49 | 48 | 24 | 39 | 41 | 65 | 47 | 39 | 41 | 38 | 54 | 46 |
| 32 | 36 | 44 | 71 | 49 | 37 | 25 | 44 | 57 | 24 | 57 | 28 | 40 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | 11 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 15 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 15 | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| 50 | 46 | 37 | 22 | 28 | 39 | 23 | 35 | 25 | 46 | 37 | 50 | 39 |
| 36 | 41 | 58 | 70 | 64 | 43 | 74 | 57 | 72 | 34 | 59 | 43 | 52 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | 13 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 16 | 11 | 13 | 7 | 16 | 5 | 13 | 11 |
| 60 | 44 | 47 | 31 | 37 | 45 | 46 | 44 | 40 | 48 | 42 | 45 | 45 |
| 28 | 42 | 45 | 59 | 54 | 36 | 42 | 43 | 53 | 33 | 53 | 43 | 43 |

## TARLE 2.2.2 (CONTINUIED)

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS CATBGORIES AMONG FRIENDS

OIHER NATIONALITY
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OTHER RACE
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER RELIGION
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER OLITURE
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody
OIHER SOCLAL CLASS
. Many
. A few people
. Nobody

| B | LK | D | GR | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | P | UK | BC $\mathbf{1 2}$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 26 | 11 | 2 | 6 | 5 |
| 44 | 33 | 33 | 11 | 24 | 48 | 34 | 25 | 48 | 37 | 29 | 45 | 35 |
| 47 | 63 | 65 | 88 | 72 | 42 | 61 | 73 | 27 | 45 | 69 | 49 | 60 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 3 |
| 27 | 22 | 16 | 6 | 16 | 40 | 16 | 1 | 25 | 34 | 30 | 40 | 26 |
| 69 | 76 | 83 | 93 | 82 | 52 | 83 | 83 | 72 | 50 | 69 | 51 | 71 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 13 | 6 |
| 33 | 27 | 32 | 10 | 24 | 44 | 49 | 26 | 31 | 41 | 27 | 57 | 36 |
| 61 | 70 | 66 | 90 | 72 | 46 | 41 | 70 | 66 | 37 | 71 | 30 | 57 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 29 | 22 | 20 | 13 | 20 | 41 | 15 | 28 | 18 | 31 | 35 | 34 | 28 |
| 66 | 76 | 79 | 84 | 76 | 51 | 83 | 68 | 79 | 57 | 62 | 62 | 67 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 8 | 6 |
| 46 | 33 | 29 | 20 | 28 | 48 | 36 | 37 | 32 | 41 | 39 | 46 | 38 |
| 46 | 61 | 68 | 76 | 65 | 42 | 58 | 56 | 62 | 44 | 58 | 45 | 55 |

TABLE 2.2.2 (END)
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS CATBGORIES AT WORK

## OIHER NATIONALITY

. Many

- A few people
- Nobody


## OTHER RACE

. Many

- A few people
- Nobody


## OIHER RELIGION

. Many
. A few people

- Nobody


## OIHER OLTTURE

. Many

- A few people
. Nobody
OTHER SOCLAL CLASS
. Many
- A few people
. Nobody

| B | DK | D | GR | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | P | UK | BC 12 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 2 | 4 |  | 2 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 14 | - | 5 |
| 26 | 25 | 37 | 8 | 19 | 29 | 15 | 8 | 31 | 36 | 9 | 35 | 26 |
| 66 | 55 | 55 | 84 | 79 | 57 | 73 | 90 | 34 | 42 | 85 | 52 | 65 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | - | 8 | - | 1 | 8 | 12 | - | 6 | 4 |
| 17 | 18 | 22 | 5 | 12 | 28 | 6 | 7 | 13 | 38 | 13 | 33 | 21 |
| 80 | 62 | 69 | 87 | 87 | 59 | 82 | 92 | 72 | 43 | 81 | 56 | 70 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 20 | 1 | 14 | 7 |
| 25 | 24 | 37 | 7 | 22 | 33 | 27 | 19 | 24 | 43 | 13 | 44 | 31 |
| 68 | 53 | 53 | 85 | 72 | 51 | 56 | 80 | 60 | 27 | 79 | 37 | 57 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 11 | - | 4 | 4 |
| 20 | 20 | 26 | 9 | 15 | 31 | 6 | 16 | 13 | 39 | 15 | 29 | 24 |
| 75 | 60 | 67 | 82 | 83 | 55 | 82 | 81 | 74 | 42 | 79 | 61 | 68 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 19 | 2 | 8 | 6 |
| 31 | 27 | 32 | 14 | 23 | 34 | 18 | 22 | 26 | 35 | 19 | 35 | 30 |
| 62 | 50 | 58 | 77 | 70 | 53 | 66 | 74 | 61 | 38 | 74 | 51 | 60 |

## 2.3. opinions held by Europeans on "others"

After this description of the way in which people perceive the presence of "others" in their own country, and of the sort of contacts they have with this category, we need to get a clearer idea of the opinions and judgments of Europeans in relation to these people.

### 2.3.1. Reactions to the presence of "others"

Question: Some people are disturbed by the opinions, customs and way of life of people different from themselves. Do you personally, in Your daily life, find disturbing the presence of people...

|  | Distur- <br> bing | Not <br> distur- reply <br> bing | Notal |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

For reasons already referred to in the preface, the title of this question, taken out of context, may seem a little odd. Within the general context of the interview, however, it seems to have been well understood.

Regardless of the category referred to, a large majority of Europeans claims to have no problems in living together with "others". The reverse is true for only one European out of every ten. It should be noted that the degree of reluctance to mix with people who are "different" is not determined by the category referred to.

Nevertheless, as the graph on the following page shows, the answers vary considerably from one country to another; with the Belgians and the Germans having the greatest difficulties in living with the "otherness" of their fellow citizens.

GROUPS WHOSE PRESENCE IS CONSIDERED DISTURBING. BY COUNTRY


The comparison of different countries shows that there is a strong correlation (correlation rate $=0.84$ ) between the number of groups considered too large, by country, and the number of groups whose presence is experienced as disturbing in daily life.

## CORRREIATION BEIWEEN THES NUNBERR OF GROUPS OCNSTDERRED TOO IARGE IN A GIVEN COONIRY AND THE NOMBER OF GROUPS CONSIDERED TO BE DISIURBING IN DAIFY ITFE



Two variables are particularly significant here: level of education and political allegiance.

## Percentage of respondents who find the presence of "others" disturbing

|  | Nation- Race ality |  | Religion | Culture | Social class |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aggregate | $11 \%$ | 14\% | 12\% | 10\% | 13\% |
| Sex |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 12 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 14 |
| Female | 10 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 12 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-24 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 14 |
| 25-39 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 12 |
| 40-54 | 11 | 14 | 10 | 10 | 11 |
| 55 and over | 15 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 13 |
| Level of education |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low | 15 | 17 | 15 | 12 | 13 |
| Medium | 10 | 13 | 9 | 10 | 13 |
| Advanced | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 11 |
| Political allegiance |  |  |  |  |  |
| Extreme left (1-2) | 8 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 16 |
| (3-4) | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 12 |
| (5-6) | 11 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 12 |
| (7-8) | 14 | 19 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| Extreme right (9-10) | 19 | 24 | 19 | 17 | 15 |

### 2.3.2. Yiews and tudoments with regard to "others"

Finally, a number of views, stereotypes or common complaints about "others" were put before the respondents.
Question: "I am going to read you out opinions. For each opinion I read out, please tell me to which, if any, kinds of people it applies." (SHOW CARD. MORE THAN ONE ANSWER POSSIBIB.)
a. People of another nationality
b. People of another race
c. People of another religion
d. People of another culture
e. People of another social class
f. None
g. All

If there are a lot of their children in a school it reduces the level of education
$\begin{array}{llllllll}\text { A } & \text { B } & \text { C } & \text { D } & \text { F } & \text { F } & \text { G } & 9 \text { Total }\end{array}$

They exploit social security benefits

Their customs are difficult to understand

Their presence in our country increases unemployment for (nationals)

Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence

Marrying into one of these groups always ends badly
$\begin{array}{lllllllll}7 & 12 & 11 & 8 & 4 & 43 & 7 & 22 & 1\end{array}$
To have them as neighbours creates problems
$\begin{array}{lllllllll}7 & 12 & 4 & 7 & 4 & 47 & 7 & 22 & 1\end{array}$
Their presence in the neighbourhood
$\begin{array}{lllllllllll}\text { modifies the prices of property } & 10 & 15 & 3 & 6 & 8 & 40 & 8 & 24 & 1\end{array}$
Among these opinions the ones shared by the least people are those relating to possible trouble with neighbours, blame for rising delinquency and the idea that mixed marriages do not work. Communication problems with "others" seems to be a more general problem. It should be noted that the various statements made here tend to refer to people of another race or nationality. The following graphs take account of the variations that exist from country to country.

1 Total exceeds 100 because more than one answer could be given.
the presence of their children reduces the LEVEL OF EDUCATION


THEY EXPLOIT SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS


THEIR CUSTOMS ARE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND


THEIR PRESENCE IN OUR COUNTRY INCREASES UNEMPLOYMENT





These statements appeal less to young people, people with a higher level of education, leaders, post-materialists and people who think of themselves as left wing.

The answers given here are furthermore closely linked to the feeling that there are too many "others" in the country. On the other hand, the link with the familiarity indicator, which tends to express the real level of contact with "others" in daily life, is a weak one. At an individual level it would seem that people who live in neighbourhoods or work within contexts where there is a wide range of different people are netther more nor less inclined than the rest of the population to have a hostile attitude to "other people". The only relationships which appear, particularly in the graph on page 45, relate to national averages and not to individual answers, which would suggest that such relations are more symbolic and subjective than concrete and objective. More in-depth research on this subject would be useful.

## CHAPITER 3

## OPINIONS ON IMMIGRAIION POLICY

IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Immigration in the European Community is a highly diverse phenomenon in terms of the populations involved, their conditions of access to the host country and legal status there.

A first open question reveals this diversity as well as the imprint of Europe's colonial past.

We shall also look at the opinions expressed by Europeans as to the general direction inmigration policy should take and the way powers between national and local level should be distributed.

### 3.1. Identity and future of immigrant populations in Furope

First of all we decided to identify the associations Europeans make with regard to immigrant populations living here, and their general views on the presence of immigrants in Europe.

### 3.1.1. Identity of immigrant populations

To get a clearer idea of how people see immgrants in Europe, an open question was put. The answers abtained were reprocessed to enable us to present them in a coherent form for the European Community as a whole (see Table overleaf). The question was as follows:
"Now let us talk about people living in (country) who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the EEC. When you hear about such people whom do you think of?"

TABLE 3.1.1
. North Africans

- Other Africans
- Asians
- Indians, Pakistanis
- Turks
. Middle East
. East Europeans
- Other Europeans
- Southern Europeans
- Blacks, coloured
- North Americans

Latin Americans

- Arabs, Muslims
- Political refugees
- Immigrants
- Others

No reply

| $\mathbf{B}$ | $\mathbf{D K}$ | $\mathbf{D}$ | $\mathbf{G R}$ | $\mathbf{E}$ | $\mathbf{F}$ | IRL | $\mathbf{I}$ | $\mathbf{L}$ | $\mathbf{N L}$ | $\mathbf{P}$ | $\mathbf{U K}$ | $\mathbf{E C} 12$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 28 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 16 | 62 | 4 | 34 | 10 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| 14 | 2 | 12 | 0 | 19 | 11 | 14 | 40 | 21 | 8 | 23 | 19 | 18 |
| 8 | 5 | 15 | 4 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 11 | 10 | 19 | 4 | 27 | 15 |
| 0 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 25 | 5 |
| 23 | 25 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 17 | 58 | 0 | - | 14 |
| 1 | 26 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| 3 | 4 | 16 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 24 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 6 |
| 2 | 9 | 5 | - | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| - | 4 | 10 | 10 | 19 | 4 | 43 | 8 | 20 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 10 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 11 | 1 | 3 |
| 11 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 27 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | - | 0 | 6 |
| 4 | 24 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 2 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 15 | 7 |
| 38 | 11 | 12 | 64 | 38 | 13 | 24 | 11 | 18 | 14 | 40 | 16 | 20 |

### 3.1.2. Evaluation of the presence of immigrants for the future of (country)

The nature of inmigration has changed: whereas for many years it was thought of in terms of manpower - in the literal sense of the word required to fill a temporary need for reconstruction and economic growth, it has to a large extent acquired a definitive and family-based form. The extent to which this development is evident or accepted varies from country to country. The purpose of the question given below is to shed light on public opinion on this matter.

Question: Do You think that the presence of people residing in (country) who do not come from one of the Member States of the European Community is a good thing, good to some extent, bad to some extent or a bad thing for the future of our country?

Results EC 12
\%
. A good thing
. Good to some extent
12)
. Bad to some extent
24)

A bad thing 11) 35
No reply 19
Total 100
For nearly one out of every two Europeans the presence of inmigrants in their country is seen as a rather positive factor for the future. A considerable minority of those questioned, however (35\%), held the opposite view. This overall result hides considerable disparities between the different countries. The table below, which shows the balance of answers per country (i.e. the difference between answers given as "a good thing" and "good to some extent" on the one hand, and "had to some extent" and "had", on the other) clearly shows the wide range of views regarding the immigrant populations' contribution to the future of the countries concerned:

Balance of views on the presence of immigrants in terms of the countries' future
. Belgium
Average EC 12
. Denmark $-20$
. Germany - 9

- France - 4
- Greece - 2

Crecce 5
. United Kingdom6

- Italy 15
. Portugal 33
- Spain 36
. Netherlands 41
. Inxemboung 48
. Ireland 57

Here again, the average opinion per country appears to be related to the size of the foreign non-EFC population in that country. In addition to reservations regarding the statistics used we repeat our earlier warning that the existence of such a link does not so much imply that hostility towards immigrants grows in proportion to their mumbers, but rather that the public debate about their presence tends to get more heated when immigration is perceived as being a more important issue in the general soctal context.

CORRETATION BEIWEEN THE ASSESSSMENT OF THE PRESENCE
OF IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRUE NUMBERS OF NON-EFC IMMIGRANTS


If one analyses the results on the basis of socio-political factors considerable variations emerge. Age is a significant variable here: negative opinions tend to predominate, particularly after 55. Other significant factors are educational level, tendency to post-materialism, tendency to leadership and right-wing views. Among the highest educational levels, leaders and post-materialists, six out of ten expressed a favourable opinion.

Other links should also be emphasised. Pessimism about the prospects of a satisfactory life and a high rating on the alienation indicator go hand in hand with a negative view of the presence of immigrants. This suggests that for many people it is an expression of frustrations in other areas.

|  | Good | Good to <br> some <br> extent | Bad to <br> some <br> extent | Bad | No <br> reply | Aggregate |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Average satisfaction <br> with life in 5 Years | 7.42 | 7.36 | 7.01 | 6.68 | 7.05 | 7.16 |
| Alienation <br> indicator | 2.76 | 2.82 | 3.02 | 3.30 | 2.85 | 2.92 |

Sense of national pride only really plays a part in relation to people who declare themselves not to be proud at all of their nationality:

| Good to | Bad to <br> some | No <br> some | Total |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| exteply |  |  |  |
| extent |  |  |  |

Sense of national pride ${ }^{2}$

| . Very proud | 44 | 36 | 20 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| - Rather proud | 46 | 36 | 18 | 100 |
| . Not very proud | 47 | 38 | 15 | 100 |
| . Not proud at all | 53 | 25 | 22 | 100 |
| . No reply | 48 | 22 | 30 | 100 |

Yet, here again there seems to be no link between living in an urban area and the answers given on the presence of immigrants, even though inmigration is essentially an urban phenomenon.

[^5]Opinions on the presence of immigrants in Europe are closely linked to opinions expressed with regard to the building of Europe. We shall give two illustrations. The first is based on a question on the future of national identities in Europe.

Question: There is a lot of talk about what the countries of the Community have in common and what makes them different from each other.
Some people say (A): if the countries of Europe were to really unite one day, it would be the end of our national, historical, and cultural identities, and our national economic interests would be sacrificed. Others say (B): the only way of defending our national, historical and cultural identities and our national economic interests in the face of the super powers is to really unite Europe.

Which of these two opinions do you feel closest to? Please indicate by ticking a box on the scale below.


The answers given to this question show that the more one is inclined to have faith in the building of Europe to ensure our future, the more one tends to see imigrants as a potentially positive factor for the future of one's country:

## Assessment of the presence of inmigrants for the future

| A good A fairly A fairly A bad | No |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| thing | Aggregate |  |
|  | good | bed |
|  | thing | thing |

Defending national identities and European union
. Average
5.25
4.89
4.38
3.99
4.58
4.66

Indication of attitude with regard to Common Market:
. Average
4.31
4.18
3.78
3.36
3.76
3.93

There is a correlation between the commitment to the Common Market on the one hand and the index which represents a synthesis of the attitudes to the European Community. Here again, we seem to have a link between a more or less positive approach to the European ideal and a positive attitude to the presence of non-EEC nationals in the country.

Finally, it is clear that all opinions expressed within the context of this study on immigrants and the assessment of their current and future presence form a coherent structure, with strong mutual correlations between the answers given. This also applies to the attitudes and opinions presented in the second part, regardless of whether one looks at whether the presence of immigrants is perceived as more or less distiurbing or the prefudices or stereotypes expressed in their regard. People who find their presence disturbing are also more negative about the effect of immigrants on the future of their country. It is interesting to note that this view is not limited to people of another nationality alone.

## Assessment of the presence of non-EBCC nationals

 for the future of the country|  | Good <br> thing | Fairly <br> good <br> thing | Fairly <br> bad <br> thing | Bad <br> thing | No <br> reply | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Frequent social intercourse with "others" in daily life, on the other hand, seems to have little effect on opinions regarding the consequences of the presence of non-EEC nationals for the future, which would seem to confirm the interpretation of the link discussed on p. 69.

Assessment of presence of nom-KFC nationals

|  | Good thing | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Fairly } \\ & \text { good } \\ & \text { thing } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Fairly } \\ & \text { bad } \\ & \text { thing } \end{aligned}$ | Bad thing | NO <br> reply | Aggregate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Familiarity indicator* thing thing |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| . Many (3) | 18 | 28 | 21 | 19 | 14 | 100 |
| - Many (1) | 15 | 36 | 24 | 12 | 13 | 100 |
| - Some (3) | 12 | 36 | 26 | 10 | 16 | 100 |
| - Some (1) | 11 | 38 | 22 | 10 | 19 | 100 |
| . None | 11 | 30 | 25 | 10 | 24 | 100 |
| Aggregate | 12 | 34 | 24 | 11 | 19 | 100 |

If we compare this with opinions expressed on racist movements we find the following structure:


Two conclusions can be drawn from this:
(1) People who claim to be in favour of racist movements do not all share the same opinion on the future effects of the presence of non-EEC nationals for their country.
(2) Certain negative attitudes towards foreigners living here, particularly those displayed by racist movements, tend to be echoed by people who otherwise tend to disapprove of those movements.

[^6]
## TABLB 3.1.1

## ASSESSMENT OF THR PRESENGE OF TMMIGRANIS FOR THR FUIURE

|  | Index |
| :---: | :---: |
| Aggregate | 2.58 |
| Sex |  |
| Male | 2.60 |
| Female | 2.56 |
| Age |  |
| 15-24 | 2.69 |
| 25-39 | 2.65 |
| 40-54 | 2.59 |
| 55 and over | 2.45 |
| Level of education |  |
| Low | 2.49 |
| Medium | 2.53 |
| Advanced | 2.84 |
| Ieadership rating |  |
| High + + | 2.81 |
| + | 2.63 |
| - | 2.52 |
| Low - - | 2.46 |
| Materialism |  |
| Materialist | 2.43 |
| Mixed | 2.56 |
| Post-materialist | 2.90 |
| Percention of own politioal allegiance |  |
| Extreme left (1-2) | 2.87 |
| (3-4) | 2.76 |
| (5-6) | 2.55 |
| (7-8) | 2.40 |
| Extreme right (9-10) | 2.30 |

### 3.2. The future of immigrants in Furope

After this general impression of views held by Europeans regarding the legal status of immigrants we now turn to their preferences regarding the best ways of improving relations with the immigrant population.

### 3.2.1. European views on what should be done about the rights of immigrants

Question: "Still talking of these people, do you think that we should...

## EC 12 <br> \%

... extend their rights 30
... restrict their rights 18
... leave things as they are? 39
No reply $\frac{13}{100}$
Total 100
The relative spread of the answers is clear: more than two-thirds of Europeans are in favour of improving or at least maintaining the rights of immigrants. Less than one in five would like to restrict those rights.

However, here again the picture at a European level does not do justice to the considerable variations existing at national level. Thus, as the graph overleaf shows, one Belgian and one Dane in three, and one German, one Frenchman and one British national in four is in favour of restricting inmigrants' rights. Inversely, nearly seven Italians in ten would like to see those rights improved. The answers given to this question are closely linked to the mumbers of inmigrants in each country.


Here again we see the same socio-politioal variables at work, i.e. age, level of education, propensity to leadership, post-materialism and political allegiance, all of which are factors of disoermment.

The way people would like to see the situation of immigrants develop has Iittle to do with the type or frequency of contacts that respondents claim to have with foreigners in their daily lives.

| Presence of people of other nationalities ${ }^{1}$ | Rights of foreigners in relation to KEF: their rights be: |  |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Improved | Maintained | Restricted | No reply |  |
| In the neighbourhood |  |  |  |  |  |
| . There are many | 27 | 38 | 26 | 8 | 100 |
| . Some | 29 | 41 | 19 | 11 | 100 |
| . None | 31 | 37 | 16 | 16 | 100 |
| No reply | 28 | 34 | 16 | 22 | 100 |
| Among friends |  |  |  |  |  |
| . There are some | 39 | 39 | 15 | 7 | 100 |
| - Some | 32 | 41 | 17 | 10 | 100 |
| . None | 27 | 38 | 19 | 16 | 100 |
| No reply | 29 | 35 | 22 | 14 | 100 |
| Among colleagues at work |  |  |  |  |  |
| - There are some | 29 | 42 | 24 | 5 | 100 |
| - Some | 27 | 44 | 19 | 10 | 100 |
| . None | 34 | 36 | 18 | 12 | 100 |
| No reply | 28 | 39 | 28 | 17 | 100 |
| AGGREGAITE | 30 | 39 | 18 | 13 | 100 |

The opinions expressed on this subject are closely linked to the general views held on the numbers of "others" in one's own country. 2 On the basis of three criteria of "otherness", i.e. race, nationality and religion, we can construct an indicator to determine whether people believe that there are too many of one or other of these categories. Respondents who did not reply "too many" once are zero rated; those who believe that there are "too many" of each of these categories are rated at three.

[^7]This general opinion on the presence of inmigrants is clearly much more significant than the situation at the work place or in the neighbourhood, or the views expressed with regard to the way the situation of immigrants should develop.

## Development of rights of non-KEC nationals

| Number of populations considered to be too large (nationality, race, religion) | Improve their rights | Maintain <br> their <br> rights | Restrict their rights | No reply | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 39 | 39 | 8 | 14 | 100 |
| 1 | 25 | 42 | 19 | 14 | 100 |
| 2 | 16 | 40 | 33 | 11 | 100 |
| 3 | 14 | 35 | 38 | 13 | 100 |

What people would like to see happen to the legal status of foreigners in Europe is closely linked to how they feel about the effect of the presence of those foreigners on the future of their country.

Development of rights of non-EBC nationals

| Assessment of their | Tmprove <br> effect on the | Maintain <br> their <br> rights | Restriot <br> rights | Restriot <br> their <br> rights | No <br> reply |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | Total

People who would like to see an improvement in the legal status of non-EFC nationals in their country also tend to be more committed to respect for public rights and freedoms. The gap is particularly noticeable when it comes to the right of people to their language and culture, and the right to asylum:

The rights of non-EBC nationals: I would like to see their rights:

## Improved Maintained Restricted No Total

Right of people to
their language and culture

| . Always | 89 | 78 | 69 | 75 | 79 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| It depends | 9 | 19 | 28 | 17 | 18 |
| No reply | 2 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Right to asylum

| . Always | 64 | 48 | 38 | 48 | 51 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| It depends | 31 | 5 | 46 | 56 | 34 |
| No reply | 6 | 6 | 6 | 18 | 72 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Finally, those Europeans who would like to see an improvement in the situation of immigrants in the Community are by and large critical of the Community's policy on protecting human rights, which they consider to be inadequate.

How people would like to see the rights of nom-EECC nationals develop

| Improved Maintained Restrioted No Total |  |
| :--- | :--- |
|  |  |
| reply |  |

Assessment of European
institutions' activities
in terms of homan rights:

| . Satisfactory | 22 | 30 | 33 | 17 | 27 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| . Not active enough | 63 | 45 | 44 | 34 | 48 |
| No reply | 15 | 25 | 23 | 49 | 25 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

TABIR 3.2.1
THE RIGHIS OF FOREIGNERS: HOW EUROPEANS WOUTD LTKE TO SEE THRE DEVEIOP


Post-materialism

| Materialist | 25 | 38 | 21 | 16 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mixed | 28 | 40 | 20 | 12 | 100 |
| Post-materialist | 45 | 36 | 11 | 8 | 100 |
| Political allegiance |  |  |  |  |  |
| Extreme left (1-2) | 51 | 26 | 14 | 9 | 100 |
| (3-4) | 39 | 37 | 13 | 11 | 100 |
| (5-6) | 28 | 40 | 19 | 12 | 100 |
| (7-8) | 18 | 47 | 23 | 12 | 100 |
| Extreme right (9-10) | 20 | 33 | 35 | 12 | 100 |

### 3.2.2. Hays of improving relations between the different communities living in Europe

A number of suggestions were put to respondents, to identify their preferences as to how relations with foreigners living here could be improved.

Question: "What could be done if one wanted to improve the relations between (nationals) and (non-nationals) living here? For each of the following could you tell me if this would be a good idea or a bad idea?"

|  |  | Results EC 12 |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Good idea | Bad idea | No reply |  |
| In order of answer given |  |  |  |  |
| . Promote the teaching of tolerance and mutual respect in schools | 89 | 4 | 7 | 100 |
| . Ensure that people in the public services and teachers treat (nationals) and (non-nationals) equally | 85 | 6 | 9 | 100 |
| . Expand international exchange programmes for young people | 83 | 7 | 19 | 100 |
| . Encourage contact between (nationals) and others, both in the neighbourhood and in associations | 78 | 10 | 12 | 100 |
| . Draw the attention of people in the press, radio and television to the part they can play in eliminating racial prejudices | 77 | 9 | 14 | 100 |
| Know the cultural customs of others | 76 | 15 | 12 | 100 |
| Learn the langrage of others | 57 | 28 | 15 | 100 |
| Prosecute in the courts people who say, write, or do things which are racist or anti-foretgner | 55 | 28 | 17 | 100 |
| Make naturalization easier | 45 | 35 | 20 | 100 |

By and large Europeans are well disposed towards suggestions to improve relations between nationals and non-nationals. This attitude tends to become less marked, however, when proposals are made which require a greater personal imput (learning a language, for instance) or when
proposals acquire a certain normative character (as in the case of prosecution, naturalization, etc.). Naturalization is the only measure in this list which does not have the support of a majority of respondents.

The graph on the following page shows that support for these various proposals is broadly comprable from one country to another.

The last three proposals (leaming a language, prosecution and naturalization) are the least popular in almost all countries.

The other suggestions are widely supported, albeit to varying degrees, in all countries.

The degree of support expressed with regard to each of these proposals is closely linked to the views held as to whether the situation of non-EFC nationals living here should be improved or not. This applies in particular to naturalization.

MEASURES TO BE ENCOURAGED: OPINIONS PER COUNTRY


ELLAS



IRELAND



NEDERLAND





ITALIA
LUXEMBOURG


### 3.3. Opinions on competence in matters comcerning immigration

A final question tries to shed light on opinions held by Europeans on how competence regarding immigration should be distributed between national and European institutions.

Question: | "Talking about these people living in (country) and who |
| :--- |
| not citizens of the European Community, in which of th |
| following ways would you prefer to define their status |

Results EC
By order of preference

One European in three would like to see the adoption of Community-wide legislation. A little under a third would prefer to see national decisions taken after consultations between the governments of the Member States. Finally, one in five is in favour of unilateral decisions taken by individual Member States.

The graph on the next page shows the considerable variations that exist between individual countries: one Dane in two wishes for the competence relating to policy on foreigners to remain strictly national, whereas four in ten Frenchmen, Italians, Iuxembourgers or Dutchmen opt for a European solution.

## LEGISLATION CONCERNING FOREIGNERS



Here again, the level of education, tendency to leadership, and political allegiance are significant socio-political variables.
domitment to the European Community, as reflected in the Attimarco index also plays a major part in whom people would like to see in charge: the more one supports Europe, the more one tends to opt for Community competence in this regard.


Attilude to the Coumon Market

| . Strong opposition | 46 | 23 | 9 | 22 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| . Moderate opposition | 32 | 27 | 22 | 19 | 100 |
| - Neutral position | 23 | 27 | 24 | 26 | 100 |
| . Moderate support | 18 | 33 | 32 | 17 | 100 |
| - Strong support | 13 | 31 | 47 | 9 | 100 |
| Aggregate | 19 | 30 | 35 | 16 | 100 |

Opinion on where authority should lie varies also according to one's opinion regarding the presence of immigrants, and whether one wishes to see a more or less favourable policy in their regard.
Individual $\left.\begin{array}{c}\text { Governments } \\ \text { after } \\ \text { govermments } \\ \text { Joint } \\ \text { consultation }\end{array}\right)$ No Aggregate

The rights of non-EBC nationals ...

| should be improved | 15 | 29 | 48 | 8 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| should be maintained | 21 | 33 | 32 | 14 | 100 |
| should be restricted | 30 | 28 | 30 | 12 | 100 |
| No reply | 11 | 22 | 19 | 48 | 100 |
| Aggregate | 19 | 30 | 35 | 16 | 100 |
| Assessment of presence of foreigners Average | 2.36 | 2.62 | 2.71 | 2.44 |  |

Further analysis shows that, on the whole, people who claim to be in favour of joint action by European countries to implement a joint policy in relation to immigrants also tend to support measures and proposals aimed at improving relations between nationals and non-nationals. This tendency is particularly pronounced in terms of support for meetings between communities, efforts to improve knowledge of cultural habits and measures aimed at facilitating naturalization of foreigners.

What is more, regardless of opinions expressed in relation to competence, preferences regarding steps to be taken in this context tend to be given in the same order. (See graph on following page.)

```
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS, BROKEN DOWN BY OPINIONS CONCERNING COMPETENCE
```



TABLE 3.3.1
LBGISLATION CONGERRNDNG FORKIGNERS

| - | Separate action | Consultation | Joint action | No reply | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agornegate | 19 | 30 | 35 | 16 | 100 |
| Sex |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 19 | 31 | 37 | 13 | 100 |
| Female | 19 | 29 | 32 | 20 | 100 |
| Afe |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15-24 | 20 | 33 | 33 | 14 | 100 |
| 25-39 | 17 | 30 | 40 | 13 | 100 |
| 40-54 | 20 | 28 | 36 | 16 | 100 |
| 55 and over | 19 | 29 | 30 | 22 | 100 |
| Ievel of educotion |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low | 20 | 28 | 30 | 22 | 100 |
| Medium | 19 | 31 | 35 | 15 | 100 |
| Advanced | 17 | 32 | 43 | 8 | 100 |
| Ieadenship |  |  |  |  |  |
| High + + | 20 | 29 | 41 | 10 | 100 |
| + | 18 | 30 | 39 | 12 | 100 |
| - | 20 | 30 | 32 | 18 | 100 |
| Low - - | 20 | 27 | 28 | 25 | 100 |

Post-materialism

| Materialist | 22 | 28 | 30 | 20 | 100 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mixed | 19 | 30 | 36 | 15 | 100 |
| Post-materialist | 17 | 32 | 41 | 10 | 100 |
| Political allegiance |  |  |  |  |  |
| Extreme left (1-2) | 18 | 27 | 42 | 13 | 100 |
| (3-4) | 18 | 30 | 39 | 13 | 100 |
| (5-6) | 19 | 31 | 36 | 14 | 100 |
| (7-8) | 22 | 31 | 32 | 15 | 100 |
| Extreme right (9-10) | 21 | 30 | 32 | 17 | 100 |

### 3.4. Racism, xenophobia and intolerance: a typology of European attitudes

This survey covers such a broad range of issues that the reader might well, at the end of this report, wish for some form of synthesis of how Europeans really feel about racism, xenophobia and intolerance. To meet this demand we have drawn up a typology of the attitudes of respondents, based on three fundamental questions: the attitude to democracy (is it always the best system?), the fact that the presence of people of another nationality, race or religion is found disturbing, and finally, the opinion on the rights of immigrant populations (should they be improved, maintained or restricted?).

Before presenting the results of this analysis we should briefly explain the procedure on which they are based. The nature of a typological analysis is to study the structure of the answers given to selected questions and to determine to what extent the individuals who took part in the survey correspond - or not, as the case may be - to this response structure. On the basis of this analysis groups of respondents who gave similar answers can be identified, these groups being as different from each other as possible.

The questions used for this analysis were the following:

Question: Here are three opinions about political systems. Which one comes closest to your own way of thinking?

1. Democracy is the best political system in all circumstances.
2. In certain circumstances a dictatorship could be a good thing.
3. Whether we live in a democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me.

Distur- Not

bing | distur- |
| :--- |
| bing |$? ~ ? ~$

| . People of another nationality | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| . People of another race | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| . People of another religion | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Question: "still talking about these people, do you thinik that ...

1. their rights should be improved
2. their rights should be restricted
3. their rights should be maintained as they are
4. ?"

Analysis has produced five coherent types (see Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2).

The first type includes people who believe that democracy is always the best form of government; they do not find the presence of others disturbing and they would like to see an improvement in the rights of immigrants. They represent $22 \%$ of Europeans. We find them mainly in Italy ( $49 \%$ of respondents) and Spain (34\%), rather than in Denmark ( $\%$ ), the United Kingdom (8\%) or Germany (11\%).

The second type closely resembles the first in terms of attitude in relation to democracy and people of a different nationality, race or religion. The difference lies in the fact that they would simply like to see immigrants' rights maintained rather than improved. This second type accounts for $28 \%$ of respondents. We tend to find them more in Denmark ( $42 \%$ of the population), the Netherlands (41\%), Luxembourg (41\%), the United Kingdom (38\%) and in Germany (37\%), than in Italy (7\%) or Spain (19\%).

The third type, like the other two, believes that democracy is the best form of government, is not disturbed by the presence of people of another nationality, race or religion, but would like to see the rights of

Immigrants curtailed. They account for $18 \%$ of Europeans, with a stronger representation in Dermark (31\%), Greece (27\%) and Portugal ( $25 \%$ ), but less so in Iuxembourg (10\%) and Itaiy (11\%).

The significant feature of the fourth type is either its rejection of the idea that democracy is always the best form of govermment, or that it believes that a dictatorship can at times be a good thing, or again that it tends to feel excluded from democratic society in general. With regard to the other questions it does not differ from the European average. This type accounts for $18 \%$ of Europeans, although $33 \%$ of the Irish population belongs to it and less than $7 \%$ in Denmark and $8 \%$ in Greece.

The fifth type, finally, covers those people who are disturbed by the presence of people of another nationality, race or religion. Although this type does not differ significantly from the rest of the population where the other questions are concerned, it should be noted that there is less of a tendency here to wish to see an improvement in the rights of inmigrants than there is to see those rights restricted. This type accounts for $14 \%$ of Europeans. It tends to be more strongly represented in Belgium (23\%) and Germany (20\%), and less so in Luxembourg (4\%), Portugal (5\%), Spain (6\%) and Ireland (7\%).

Socio-demographic characteristics do not seem to have much to do with which type one belongs to, except perhaps for level of education.
Socio-political indicators, on the other hand, appear to be slightly more significant, specifically as regards political allegiance and post-materialism. But here again, the effect is hardly determining. The conclusion, therefore, is that social or political divisions do not explain the structure of this particular typology.

In other words, the discussion surrounding the place of "others" in our societies seems to have produced five main attitudes: an attitude of progressive tolerance (type 1), an attitude of conservative tolerance (type 2), an attitude of strict rules of aitizenship (type 3), an attitude of suspicion with regard to democracy (type 4) - which may be influenced by factors other than immigration - and finally, an attitude of rejection (type 5). Although the first two (tolerant) types are in a majority, we should note that this majority represents just about $50 \%$. On the other hand we should also note that of the five types type 5 alone (i.e. $14 \%$ of the population) adopts an unoompromisingly hostile attitude.

## tabtr 3.4.1

## DESCRIPTION OF TYPES

Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 6 Total
Opinion on democracy
. Best form of government
. Dictatorship may be a good
thing
. Makes no difference to people
like me
. No reply

| 100 | 100 | 100 | - | 68 | 78 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - | - | - | 40 | 13 | 9 |
| - | - | - | 55 | 16 | 12 |
| - | - | - | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Finds presence of "others" disturbing ...

| ... nationality: | Yes | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | 75 | 11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No | 100 | 98 | 97 | 97 | 9 | 86 |
|  | No reply | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 3 |
| TOTAL |  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| ... race: | Yes | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 81 | 14 |
|  | No | 98 | 96 | 93 | 93 | 4 | 83 |
|  | No reply | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 3 |
| TOTAL |  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| . . . religion: | Yes | 4 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 54 | 11 |
|  | No | 95 | 95 | 93 | 91 | 29 | 85 |
|  | No reply | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 4 |
| TOTAL |  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Opinion on the rights of non-ERC
nationalis

| . Should be improved | 100 | - | - | 31 | 12 | 30 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| - Should be restricted | - | - | 53 | 18 | 39 | 18 |
| - Should be maintained | - | 100 | - | 37 | 32 | 39 |
| - No reply |  | - | - | 47 | 14 | 17 |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  |  | 22 | 28 | 18 | 18 | 14 |
| SIGNIFICANCE OF TYPES |  |  |  |  |  |  |

TABLE 3.4.2
SIGNLFICANGE OF TYPES IN RELAITION TO thir various siscions of the population

|  |  | Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Toial |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | Belgium | 16 | 24 | 21 | 16 | 23 | 100 |
|  | Denmark | 6 | 42 | 31 | 7 | 14 | 100 |
|  | Germany | 11 | 37 | 18 | 14 | 20 | 100 |
|  | Greece | 25 | 22 | 27 | 8 | 18 | 100 |
|  | Spain | 34 | 19 | 18 | 23 | 6 | 100 |
|  | France | 21 | 20 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 100 |
|  | Ireland | 16 | 30 | 14 | 33 | 7 | 100 |
|  | Italy | 49 | 7 | 11 | 22 | 11 | 100 |
|  | Iuxembourg | 29 | 41 | 10 | 18 | 4 | 100 |
|  | Netherlands | 19 | 41 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 100 |
|  | Portugal | 24 | 31 | 25 | 15 | 5 | 100 |
|  | United Kingdom | 8 | 38 | 22 | 20 | 12 | 100 |
| Sex | Male | 23 | 30 | 17 | 16 | 14 | 100 |
|  | Female | 22 | 26 | 19 | 19 | 14 | 100 |
| Age | 15-24 | 24 | 29 | 16 | 21 | 10 | 100 |
|  | 25-39 | 29 | 27 | 17 | 15 | 12 | 100 |
|  | 40-54 | 24 | 27 | 19 | 16 | 14 | 100 |
|  | 55 and over | 16 | 29 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 100 |
| Ftucational level |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Low | 20 | 23 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 100 |
|  | Medium | 20 | 31 | 18 | 18 | 13 | 100 |
|  | Advanced | 33 | 32 | 14 | 13 | 8 | 100 |
| Inoome | Low - - | 20 | 26 | 17 | 20 | 17 | 100 |
|  | - | 21 | 26 | 20 | 18 | 15 | 100 |
|  | $+$ | 27 | 29 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 100 |
|  | High + + | 28 | 32 | 17 | 13 | 10 | 100 |
| Politiaal allegiance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Extreme left | 41 | 18 | 14 | 16 | 11 | 100 |
|  | Left | 32 | 29 | 15 | 14 | 10 | 100 |
|  | Centre | 21 | 28 | 18 | 19 | 14 | 100 |
|  | Right | 14 | 23 | 23 | 16 | 24 | 100 |
|  | Extreme right | 16 | 23 | 19 | 28 | 14 | 100 |
| Post-materialism indicator |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Materialist | 18 | 26 | 20 | 20 | 16 | 100 |
|  | Mixed | 21 | 29 | 19 | 18 | 13 | 100 |
|  | Post-materialist | 37 | 29 | 11 | 13 | 10 | 100 |
| AgGrigate |  | 22 | 28 | 18 | 18 | 14 | 100 |

ANDEXES

## ANNEX 1

TECHNICAL DATA

## InSTITUTS CiARSES OU SUMOAGE EI SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES

## IMSTITUIES WHICH CARRIEO OUT THE SURVEY AHO EXPERTS IN CHARGE

| BELGIQUE/BELGIE | OIMARSO H.V. | Lle SChulpem | Tél. 322.215.19.30. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 78 8oulevard Lambernont |  | Télex 046.64577 |
|  | 8-1030-89UXELLES |  | Telefax 322.218.00.99 |
| dankark | gallup rarkegsanalyse a.s. | Poolf ramorup | Tél. 451.29 .88 .00 |
|  | Ganmel Vartorvej 6 , |  | Télex 055.15180 |
|  | OK-2900 hellerup, Copeihhageid | . | Telefax 451.18.24.66 |
| OEUTSCHLAND | EANID-IHSTITUT Gmbh | dalter TACKE | Tél. 49.521 .260 .010 |
|  | 8odelschwingnstrasse 23-25a | Klaus-Peter SChoEPPNER | Télex 041.932833 |
|  | 0-4800 BIELEFELO 1 | Franz KILZER | Telefax 49.521.260.01.55 |
| ELLAS | ICAP HELLAS S.A. | Anthony LYKIAROOPOULOS | Tél. 201.722.56.51 |
|  | 54 Queen Sophia Avenue | Tilemachos DIB | Télex 0601.215736 |
|  | GR-115 28 ATHENS |  | Telefax 301.722.02.55 |
| ESPANA | INTERGALLUP | Jaine MIQUEL AORAOA | Tél. 341.252 .62 .54 |
|  | po de la Castellana, 72-10 | Luis PAHBLANCO | Télex 052.87804 |
|  | E-280046 HADRID |  | Telefax 341.563.22.26 |
| Frahce | INSTITUT DE SONDAGES Làvialle | Albert LAVIALLE | Iél.331.45.54.97.11 |
|  | 6-8 Rue du 4 Septembre | Florence SIOUFFI | Télex 205165 |
|  | F-92130 ISSY-LES-HOULIMEAUX |  | Telefax 331.45.54.74.47 |
| IRELAMD | IRISH :IAPKETIMG SURVEYS Ltd | Charles COYLE | Tél. 353.170 .11.96 |
|  | 19-20 Upper Pembroke Sireet | dary BOYCE | Télex 0500.30617 |
|  | IRL-OUBLIN 2 |  | Telefax 353.176.03.77 |
| ITALIA | ISTITUIO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE E | Ennio SALAMON | TS1. 392.48.19.33.20 |
|  | L'ANALISI OELL'OPIIIOHE PUBBLICA (DOXA) | Alfonso del RE | Télex 321.101 |
|  | Via Panizza 7, |  | Telefax 392.48.19.32.86 |
|  | I-20144 HILAHO |  |  |
| LUXEHBOURG | IHSTItUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS de recherches | Louis HEVIS | TĖ. 352.47.50.2i. |
|  | SOCIALES (ILRES) | Charles MARGUE | Télex 0402.60468 |
|  | 6, rue du Harché-aux-herbes |  | Telefax 352.46.26.20 |
|  | SO- 172日 LUXEHBOURG |  |  |
| NEDERLAND | IIEDERLANDS I!Stituut \%oor of publiexe | Arnold UEIJTLANDT | Tél. 31.20.24.88.44 |
|  | OPIHIE (AIPO) B.V. | Martin jOMKER | Télex 044.14614 |
|  | Westerdokhuis, Jarentzolein 7 |  | Telefax 31.20.26.43.75 |
|  | NL-1013 AHSIEROAH |  |  |
| PORTUGAL | NORHA - Sociedade de Estudos para o | Mario bacalhau | Tél. 351.1 .76 .76 .04 |
|  | Desenvolvimento de Eapresas, S.A.R.L. |  | Télex 0404.12604 |
|  | Rua Marqués de fronteira, 76 |  | Telefax 351.1.773.948 |
|  | P-1000 LISB0A |  |  |
| UNITED KINGDOM | SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) | Horman WEBB | Têl. 441.794 .04 .61 |
|  | 202 Finchley Poad, | Robert :IYBROW | Télex : 051.261712 |
|  | UK - LONDON ilis 63L |  | Telefax : 441.431.02.52 |
| Coordination internationale/International coordination : |  |  |  |
| Hélère RIFFAULT - Jean-François TCHERNIA |  |  |  |
| fnits Et OPIMIOHS |  |  |  |
| 25, rue Cambon, F-75001 PARIS |  |  |  |
|  | Tél. 331.42.90.-i.65-1élex 2147 | - Ielefax 331.42.60.40 |  |

Toutes les dennées relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgitan Archives for the Social Sciences", (1, place Hontequieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-ileuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organisaes membres du European Consortiun for Political Research (Essex), du In-ter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant dun intérêt de recherche.

Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à linitiative fe la Commission des Communautés européennes, écrire à Karlheinz REIF, "Sondages, recherches, analyses, 200, rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.
(*) Les douze instituts chargés de ces sondages sont représentés par la société THE EUROPEAN OMHIBUS SURVEYS s.c., dont le comité de direction comprend : Jan Stapel (NIPO. Ansterdam), Horman Webb (gallup internatioNAL, Londres), Hélène Riffault et JeanFrançois Tchernia (faits $\varepsilon$ OpIMIONS, Paris) et Nicole Jamar (the european ohnibus surVEYS, Bruxelles).
(**) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par Irish larketing Surveys et Social Sirveys (Gallup Poll).

All Euro-Baroneter data are stored at the Belgian Aिchives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Hontesquieu, 8-1348 Louvain-La-ifeuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes meabers of the European Consortiun for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and all those interested in social science research.

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, piease urite to Karlheinz REIF. "Surveys, Researches, Analyses", 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

The tuelve institutes which carried out these surveys are represented by THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEYS s.c., of which the board wenbers are : Jan Stapel (HIPO, Ansterdam), Norman Webb (GALLUP INTERNATIONAL, London), ::élène Riffault and Jean-François Tchernia (faIts Et OPIAIONS, Paris) and Nicole Jamar (the european ohnibus SURVEYS, Brussels).

The Northern Ireland survey is conducted jointly by Irisn Narketing Sur.veys and Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

## echantillonnage/sampling

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population âgée de 15 ans et plus, des douze pays de la Communauté élargie. L'échantillonnage de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux :
$\mathrm{I}^{\circ}$ ) Régions et localités d'enquête
L'enquête a lieu sur l'ensemble du territoire des douze pays, soit 138 régions. (Voir liste ci-jointe)

Chaçue pays a constitué aléatoirement un échan-til!on-maître de localités d'enquête, de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au iotal, les intervieys ont lieu dans environ 1.350 points d'enquête.

The sample bas been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the twelve countries of the enlarged Community. In eaci country a two stage sampling method is used :
$1^{\circ}$ ) Geographical distribution

The survey covers the whole territory of the tuelve countries i.e. 139 regions. (See attached list)

In each country a ramdom selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc..) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more or less 1.350 sampling points.
20) Choix des personnes interrogées

Les perscnnes interrogées sont loujours diffé rentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'échantillonmaître aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées :

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers : Danemark, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas. ;
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: Belgique, France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande ;
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux précédentes (cheminement systématique) : Allemagne, Grèce, Espagne, Portugal.


## 20) Choice of respondents

Sor each survey different incividuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Hithin these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen :

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Denmark, Luxembourg. Netherlands ;
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and occupation on the basis of census data : this system is used in Belgium, France, Italy, United-Kingdom, Ireland ;
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("randoa route") : Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal.

|  | Population (1) |  |  | Echantillons/ Samples (2) (Euro-8aromètre no 30) | Dates <br> (Euro-Baromètre no 30) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Milliers <br> /Thousanos | CE/EC <br> 10 | CE/EC <br> 12 |  |  |
| 8 | 7.924 | 3.64 | 3.12 | 1.024 | 18/10 au 06/11/1988 |
| OK | 4.133 | 1.90 | 1.62 | 1.006 | $31 / 10$ au 19/11/1988 |
| 0 | 51.466 | 23.62 | 20.25 | 1.051 | $17 / 10$ au 09/11/1988 |
| GR | 7.715 | 3.54 | 3.04 | 1.000 | 17/10 au 07/11/1988 |
| F | 42.851 | 19.67 | 16.87 | 1.001 | $22 / 10$ au 10/11/1988 |
| IRL | 2.455 | 1.13 | . 97 | 1.012 | 18/10 au 10/11/1988 |
| ! | 44.438 | 20.30 | 17.49 | 1.058 | $26 / 10$ au $10 / 11 / 1988$ |
| L | 300 | . 14 | . 12 | 300 | 20/10 au 21/11/1988 |
| ill | 11.400 | 5.23 | 4.49 | 1.006 | 22/10 au 06/11/1988 |
| UK | 45.207 | 20.75 | 17.79 | 1.324 | $20 / 10$ au $15 / 11 / 1988$ |
| CE/EC 10 | 217.889 | 100.00 | 85.77 | 9.782 | 17/10 au 21/11/1988 |
| E | 28.854 | - | 11.35 | 1.013 | 17/10 au 04/11/1988 |
| ? | 7.314 | - | 2.88 | 1.000 | 19/10 au 14/11/1988 |
| CE/EC 12 | 254.057 | - | 100.00 | 11.795 | 17/10 au 21/11/1988 |

Il est rappelé que les résultats obtenus par sondage sont des estimations dont le degré de certitude et de précision dépend, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, du nonbre des individus constituant l'échantillon. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1.000, on admet généralement qu'une différence inférieure à cinq pour cent entre deux pourcentages est au-dessous du niveau acceptable de confiance.

Readers are reminded that sample survey results are estimations, the degree of certainty and precision of which, everything being kept equal rests upon the number of cases. With samples of about 1.000 , it is generally admitted that a percentage difference of less than five per cent is below the acceptable level of confidence.
(1) 15 ans et plus. / 15 years and over.
(2) Nombre dinterviews. / Number of interviens.

| BELGIqUE/BELGIE | Saarland | ITALIA | UNITED KIMGOOM |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Berlin (Mest) |  |  |
| Vlans gewest |  | Nord-Ovest | North |
| Région Hallonne |  | Piemonte | Yorkshire and Hunberside |
| Bruxelles/Brussel | dahmark | (Valle diAosta) | East Midlands |
| Antwerpen |  | Liguria | East Anglia |
| Brabant | Jylland | Lonbardia | South-East |
| Hainaut | Sjaelland | Nord-Est | South-Kest |
| Liège | Fyn | Irentino-Alto Adige | Hest Midlands |
| Limburg |  | Veneto | North-Hest |
| Luxembourg |  | Friuli-Venezia Giulia | Hales |
| Namur | FRANCE | Enilie-Ronagne | Scotland |
| Oost-Vlaanderen |  | Centro | Northern Ireland |
| Hest-Vlaanderen | Ile de France | Toscane |  |
|  | Bassin parisien | Umbria |  |
| , | Chamagne-Ardennes | Marche | ELLAS |
| BUHDE SREPUBLIK | Picardie | Lazio |  |
| DEUTSCHLAND | Haute-Hormandie | Canpania | Kentriki Ellas kai |
|  | Centre | Abruzzi-Molise | Evia |
| Schleswig-Holstein | Basse-Normandie | Abruzzi | Peloponnissos |
| Harburg | Bourgogne | Molise | Ionioi Missoi |
| Hierdersachsen | Hord-Pas de Calais | Sud | Ipiros |
| Braunschweig | Est | Puglia | Thessalia |
| Hannover | Lorraine | Basilicata | Makedonia |
| Lüneburg | Alsace | Calabria | Thraki |
| Heser-Ems | Franche-Conté | Sicilia | Missoi Aigaiou |
| Bresen | Ouest | Sardegna | Kriti |
| Nordrheim-Hestfalen | Pays de la Loire |  |  |
| Düsseldorf | Oretagne |  |  |
| Köln | Poitou-Charentes | LUXEMBOURG (GRAMD-DUCHE) | ESPANA |
| Münster | Sud-Ouest |  |  |
| Detmold | Aquitaine |  | Noreste |
| Arnsberg | Midi-Pyrénées | MEDERLAND | Levante |
| Hessen | Limousin |  | Sur |
| Darmstadt | Centre-Est | Noord-Nederland | Centro |
| Kassel | Rhône-Alpes | Groningen | Noroeste |
| Rheinland-Pfalz | Auvergne | Friesland | Norte |
| Koblenz | Méditerranée | Urenthe |  |
| Trier | Languedoc-Roussillon | Oost-Nederland |  |
| Rheinnessen-Pfalz | Provence-Alpes-Côte | Overijssel | PORIUGAL |
| Baden-kürttenberg | d'azur | Gelderland |  |
| Stutigart | (Corse) | Hest-Hederland | Grande Lisboa |
| Karlsruhe |  | Utrecht | Grande Porto |
| Freizurg |  | Hoord-Holland | Litoral |
| Tübingen | IRELAND | Zuid-Holland | Interior Norte |
| Bayern |  | Zeeiano | Interior Sul |
| Oberbayern | Donegal | Zuid-Hederland |  |
| Niederbayern | North West | Noord-Brabant |  |
| Oberpfalz | North East | LImburg |  |
| Oberfiranken | Hest |  |  |
| Mittelfranken | Hidlands |  |  |
| Unteriranken | East |  |  |
| Schwaien | Hid thest |  |  |
|  | South East |  |  |
|  | South liest |  |  |

ANNEX 2
SOCIO-POLTMICAL VARIABLES

## SOCIO-POTHIICAL CLASSIFICATIONS

## USEC IN EUTRO-BAROMIEIER SURYEYS

## A. POLITICAL POSITIONING

Question: "Talking about politios, people talk about "right" and "left". Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Show scale going from 1 (left) to 10 (right).)"

On the basis of this question respondents have been classified as follows:

- Extreme left: $1+2$
- Left: $\quad 3+4$
- Centre: $\quad 5+6$
- Right: $\quad 7+8$
- Extreme right: $9+10$

It is also possible to calculate for any population group the average rating that it would give itself on the above scale.

## B. SATISFACIION WIIH LIFB

Question: "Generally speaking, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not particularly satisfied or not satisfied at all with the life you are iiving?"

Answers to this question provide useful indicators of people's individual morale.

## C. LEVEI OF EDOCATION

In view of the diversity of education systems in the Member States of the European Community, and of the fact that elderly people have gone through an entirely different school system than the ones we have today, information on respondents' level of education is obtained in the following way:

Question: "At what age did you finish full-time education?"
Respondents are then classified in three categories (according to length of studies):

- Low level: finished at 15 or before
- Medium level: finished at 16, 17, 18 or 19
- Advanced level: finished at 20 or more.


## D. LEVET OF INOOME

Question: "We would like to analyse the results of this survey in terms of the levels of income of the people who have replied. Here is a scale of incomes; we would like to know where you would situate your household, on the basis of the wages, pensions, income or other resources of the persons living with You"

Each country uses a scale with between 8 and 12 categories, corresponding to national norms (notably with regard to monthly or anmal income).

The spread of answers in each country is then analysed (on the basis of a log-normal distribution) and four quartiles established. At a European level. the upper quartiles of each country are studied, then the lower quartiles, etc. We end up with a classification into four groups, plus the group of people who have not replied.

Lower quartile R--
R-
R+
Higher quartile R++

## B. IRADERSSHIP INDICATOR

What is an "opinion leader"? It is someone who, within the context of certain sociai functions, tends to have more influence on the opinions of others than vice-versa. If all the members of a social group were equivalent and interchangeable in terms of the forming of opinions, attitudes and behaviour of the group, the group would continue to function in its own way, even if one or other member were to disappear. The "leader" is he/she who makes a difference in this respect: he/she influences the others more than he/she is influenced by them, and not only from time to time but in a relatively constant and predictable way.

Market studies as well as opinion surveys, and, in a more general sense, social psychology studies, are aimed notably at identifying these leaders. To do so, we only have the following three methods:

1. socio-metrical studies of the respective influences within a given group, although this method is really only practicable in laboratory conditions or in small groups;
2. questioning "privileged respondents", i.e. those who claim to have a "leadership function" in a specific group. This method suffers from the same limitations as the previous one. It moreover runs the risk of identifying "notables", i.e. people who occupy a clearly identifiable social position, rather than "leaders" who are genuinely involved in the life of the group in question;
3. The autoselection of leaders by means of survey methods, i.e. a method consistent with the purpose of defining leaders as individuals who present certain characteristios normally identified as representing a "leadership" attitude, such as an interest in certain problems and a certain degree of activity, both in terms of scope and depth, in the life of the group.

We have chosen the third method because we considered it to be the only one which could be used in an operational context in relation to representative samples of many diverse populations.

An analysis of the results obtained during previous surveys has shown that it makes statistical sense to construct an indicator on the basis of answers given by all respondents to two questions relating to the inclination to discuss politios among friends and the inclination to convince others of a strongly held opinion. To avoid any confusion with the concept of "institutional leader", which is often used in other research of the same nature, we have used the term "leadership indicator".

This indicator has been built up of four degrees, the highest degree corresponding to those whom we shall henceforth refer to as opinion leaders, i.e. approximately $12 \%$ of the European population, and the lowest degree, the non-leaders (approximately 25\%); the two intermediary degrees correspond to those who are relatively above or below the average in this regard.

The following table shows how the leadership indicator was constructed.
Convince others...
often from time rarely never noreply to time

Discuss politios...

| often | ++ | ++ | + | + | + |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| from time to time | + | + | - | - | - |
| never | - | - | - | - | - |
| no reply | - | - | - | - | - |

## F. POST-MATERTALISK INDICATOR

(See the work of Ronald Inglehart, particularly "The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics", Princeton University Press, 1977)

The post-materialism indicator, designed to measure the degree to which each respondent is attached to post-materialist or materialist values, is based on answers to the following question:
"There is a lot of talk about the objectives that (your country) should strive to achieve in the next 10 to 15 years. This list includes objectives that certain people believe should have priority. Can you tell me which of these objectives you personally believe are the most important ones in the long-term? (SHOW CARD - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Which do you believe is the second most important objective?"
First Second

| 1 | 1 | Maintain order in the country |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | 2 | Increase participation of citizens in government decisions |
| 3 | 3 | Fight rising prices |
| 4 | 4 | Guarantee freedom of expression |
| 0 | 0 | None |

The respondent, who is in a forced choice situation, expresses his/her preferences etther for materialist themes, i.e. maintaining order or fighting rising prices, or for post-materialist themes, such as increasing participation etc. or graranteeing freedom of expression. The choice is given twice, three combinations are possible: two post-materialist answers, one post-materialist and one materialist answer, two materialist answers. People who have not replied to one of the two choices, or to neither, are not included in the result. By using the following table, respondents can be divided into four groups.

First response

|  | Main- <br> taining <br> Order | Increas- <br> ing <br> partici- <br> pation | Fighting <br> rising <br> prices | Guaran- <br> teeing <br> freedom <br> of | No |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## G. CONSIRDCIION OF THE INDTCATOR OF ATHIIUDES TO THE COMANIITY

Question: Generally speaking, do you feel that the fact that (your country) is part of the European Community (Common Market) is...

1. a good thing
2. a had thing
3. neither good nor had
O. No reply

Question: If you were told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) was abandoned, would you experience regret, indifference (you would not care one way or the other) or great rellef?

1. Regret
2. Indifference
3. Great rellef
4. No reply

| Answer to question on the abandonment of the Cormon Market | Answer to the question on belonging to the common Market |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Good thing | Neither good nor bad or no reply | Bad thing |
| Regret | $\begin{gathered} 5 \\ \text { (strong support) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4 \\ \text { (Moderate support) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3 \\ \text { (Neutral } \\ \text { pasition) } \end{gathered}$ |
| Indifference or no reply | (Moderate support) | $\stackrel{3}{(\text { Neutral position) }}$ | 2 (Moderate (mosition) opposition) |
| Relief | $\begin{gathered} 3 \\ \text { (Neutral } \\ \text { position) } \end{gathered}$ | (Moderate opposition) | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \\ & \text { (Strong } \\ & \text { opposition) } \end{aligned}$ |

This indicator was devised during research aimed at arriving at a synthesis of attitudes to the European Community, referred to here as the Common Market. There is always a strong correlation between this indicator and the most diverse opinions expressed with regard to the European Community.

ANNEX 3
STATISTICS

## EUROPEAN STATISTICS ON THR FOREIGI POPUAATION

The statistical data used in this survey have been taken from:
"L'Europe multiraciale - Documents Observateur - No 4 January/February 1989".

The following table gives the mumber of non-EFC foreigners for each country, their relative numbers in relation to the total population of the country, and the year in which the information was collected.
Country
foreigners $\quad$ \% total pop. Year

| Belgium | 380000 | 3.8 | 1987 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Denmark | 83000 | 1.8 | 1985 |
| Germany | 3250000 | 5.3 | 1987 |
| Greece | 60000 | 0.6 | 1987 |
| Spain | 140000 | 0.3 | 1987 |
| France | 2102000 | 3.9 | 1985 |
| Ireland | 21000 | 0.6 | 1985 |
| Italy | 391000 | 0.7 | 1987 |
| Inxembourg | 3300 | 1.0 | 1985 |
| Netherlands | 386000 | 2.7 | 1985 |
| Portugal | 59000 | 0.5 | 1985 |
| United Kingdom | 971000 | 2.2 | 1985 |

ANNEX 4

QUESTIONNAIRE

EURO-BAROHETRE 30-2
Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988
118. Uans l'ensemole, á quel point ètes-vous satisfait ou pas de la vie que vous menez en ce moment ? Yeuillez utiliser cette échelle pour préciser votre réponst. "lu" signifie tout d fait satisfait, "l" signifie pas du tout satisfait. (MOMTRER (A CARTE).

119. Fin utilisant ia méne échelle, où pensez-vous que vous jerez Uans cing ans ; "lo" signifie tout a fait satisfait "!" signifie pas du tout satisfait. (MONTRER LA CARTE).


XURO-BAKCAKTAR 30 -
1ls. All in all to what excenc would you say you are sacisfied with chu life you lead at this tive ? please use chis seale (SHOW CRRD) to decide on your reply. "10" means you are
 conplctely sa
dissucisficd.

$$
\begin{array}{lllllllllllc}
\text { Complecely } \\
\text { dissintisfied } & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 5 & 9 & 10 & \text { Samplecely } \\
& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & x & 7 e d
\end{array}
$$

119. Usiny the same scale, (SHOW CARD) how sacisficid do yiu think you will be in five guars lime ?
```
    Complecely,
    Complecely, Complecely
    dissatigficd lllllllllllllll
```

125/I am going to say some things chat some people say they
127. somecimes feel. Do you yoursclf ever happen co think that ...
Most pcople in positions of power try to gain some
ching out of people like you .............................. 1 ,
People who rill che councry are nat readly concernad
with what happans to you ............................... 2
riu fect left out of what is happening around you. 3 J 3
The rith get richer aft the poar get poorer....... \& \& 4
What you chink Joesn't count very much ............ 5 s 5
TREND EURO $26-0.1011165$
130. Uiriez-vous que vous ètes fier d'ètre (nationdité). trẻs fier, plutdt fier, pas tellement fier, ou pas fier du tout ?

Très fier
Plutot fier
Pas tellement rier
Pas fier du tout
130. Hould you say you are wery proud, quice prowd, not very proud, not at all proud, to be (nationality)?

1. vary proud
2. Ouite proud
3. Hot wery proud
4. Noe ac all proud
5. 7

TREMD EURO 26 - 0. 160

EUKo-baronetre 30-5-
Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988
161. A votre avis, quelles sont aans la liste suivante, les grandes causes qui de nos jours valent la peine de prendre des risques et d'accepter des sacrifices? (MONTRER LA LISTE. REPONSES HULTIPLES).

1. ا.'egalice des scxes
2. La protection de la nature
3. La puix dans le monde
4. L. i lutce concre le racisme
5. La defense de (notre pays)
b. Ma foi religieuse
6. L.'unification de l'Europe
7. L. unification de l'Europe
8. La lutte contre la misère
9. L. liberté de lindivi
10. Les droics de l'homme
O. Les droils de
$x$. La révolution
Y. Rien de tout celd
11. ?

$$
\text { TRENO EURO - } 28-0.144 \text { MOUIFIEE }
$$

162/ A votre dvis, quel est le probleme le plus important 163. (HONTRER LA CARTE), et quel est le problème le moins important de ceux qui semblent se poser aujourd'hui en (pays).


Les inconvénients de la vie moderne
(bruits, pollution, conditions de logenent,
etc. l.................................

| 1 | 1 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 |
| 5 | 3 |
| 6 | 6 |
| 0 | 0 |

aURO-anRONATEAR 30 - S -
TO EvERyBODY
161. In your opinion, in this list (SBOW LIST) which are the great causes which nowadays are woth the crouble of caking risks and auking sacrifices for 7 (SEVERAL ANSWERS POSSIBLB).

1. Sexual lequality

Proteccion of wildile
worla peace

- The scraggle agsinst racism

3. Altencer of (cuunery)

Hy religious caith
The unification of surope
Fight dgainst povercy
. Freedon of the individual
0. Human rights
$x$. The cevolution
$Y$. None of these

- ?

TREND EURO 28 - O. 144 MODIFIED

162; In your opinion, which of these problems (SBOW LIST) that
163. soed to face us nowadays is the most important ? And which of these is the least important ?


The pressure of modern living fnoise pollution, housing condicions esc.1....... 1
rears about parsonal satety .................. 2

Unemploument ...................................... . . 3
rown feople doing is they lite regiondiess of

| That inatysant popmiatjen | , |
| :---: | :---: |

Lass ur retigicats values ....................... oi i
None in purciculse ........................................... 0

EURO-BAROMETRE 30-6-
Jeudi 20 Octobre 988
164. Laquelle de ces deux opinions est la plus proche de la votre ? (MOMTRER LA LISTE).

1. Je trouve que la liberté et l'égalité sont également importantes i mais s'il fallait choisir l'une ou l'autre, je considèrerais que la liberte est plus importante. c'est-a-dire que chacun puisse vivre en liberté et se developper sans contrainte.
2. Certainement ld liberté et l'egalite sont importantes mais s'il fallait que je choisisse, je considèrerais que l'égulitè est la plus importante, c'est-a-dire que personne ne soit defavorise et que la difference entre les classes sociales ne soit pas aussi forte.
3. Hi l'une ni l'autre
U. ?

IRENO ENQUETE VALEURS Q. 274
165. Voici trois opinions sur les régimes politiques. (MONTRER LA CARTE). (pelle est celle qui correspond le mieux á ce que vous pensez vous-ineme ?

1. La dèmocratie est, quoiqu'il arrive, le ineilleur des régimes.
2. Uans certaines circonstances, une dictature peut ètre une bonne chose.
3. Que notre pays soit en démocratie ou en dictature, cela ne change rien pour les gens comme moi.
$166 /$ Pour chacun des droits et des libertes de l'homme suivants, 168. pouvez-vous mc dire si, en gėnéral, vous estimez qu'ils doivent étre toujours respectés dans n'importe quelles circonstances, ou que cela dëpend des circonstances ?

|  | 166 | 167 | 167 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Toujours | Cela dépend | ? |
| Liberté d'expression | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Droit a l'integrice physique | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Liberté d'association ...... | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Droit des peuples a leur langue et d leur |  |  |  |
| culture | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Liberté religieuse et de conscience ..... | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Egalite devant la loi ..................... | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Droit de chacun de trouver asile | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Droit de travailler | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Droft de propriete | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Droit a l'éducation et a la formation... | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Droit a l-information ..................... | $x$ | $x$ | $x$ |
| Droit au respect de la vie privée | $Y$ | $Y$ | $Y$ |

169/ D'une maniére qėnérale, (HKHIRER (A CARTE), que diriez-vuus
172. du nombre da personnes d'une autre nationalite qui vivent dans notre pays : y en a-t-il trop, beducoup mais pas trop ou pas beducoup ?
b) Et les personnes d'une autre race qui vivent dans notre pays : y en d-t-il trop, beaucoup mais pas trop ou pas beaucoup?
c) Et les personnes d'une autre religion qui vivent dans notre pays : y en a-t-il trop, beaucoup mais pas trop ou pas notre pays
beducoup?
beducoup
d) Et les personnes d'une autre culture qui vivent dans notre pays : y en a-t-il trop. beducoup mais pas trop ou pas beaucoup?
e) Et les personnes d'une autre classe sociale qui vivent dans notre pays: yen a-t-il trop, beaucoup mais pas trop ou pas beaucoup?

| $\begin{array}{r} \text { Trop } \\ 169 \end{array}$ | Beaucoup mais | Pas |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | pas trop | beaucoup | ? |
|  | 170 | 171 | 172 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Autre nutionalite
Autre race
Altire religion
Alltre culture
Alltre classe sociale

SURO-BAROMTIEH $30-6$
leudi 20 occobra $198 s$
164. Which of chese two statemonts chacs closest to your own opinion? (SHOW LIST).

1. I find that both frectom and equality are importanc. Buc if I were to make up wy mind for one or che other, 1 vould cunsider personal freedom more important, that is everyone can live in treedom and develop without hindrance.
2. Certainly both freedon and equalicy are importanc. But if $i$ wert to make up un inina for one ot chic enc. 1 waild consider
 and chat sacisa clasis diffurences are mat so shiony.
3. Hejcher
o.?
trend values survey - 0.774
4. Hore are three opinions abour political systems (Show CAN). which one comes ciosest to your own way of chintathy?
!. Democracy is the best political system in all carcurastances.
5. In cerlain circunstances a diccacorship could be a good Uing
. Whether we live in a democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me.

166/ For each of the following rigits and diberties of man, can
68. you rell me if in general you chink that chay should always be respeced under all circuastances or does it depend upan the sithation ?

| 166 | 167 | 168 |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| Always It dopaindy |  |  |

Frecdom or specen ........................... 1 1

The righ tia personal safacy and procec-
cion ...........................................
Freedon or associscion ....................... j 3 3
The right of pcoplo to chair oun

or $\operatorname{con}^{-}$
science ....................
Equality before cha lan
The righi co osytum
The riglit to work
Alght to own propercy
The righe co educaty
The right to education and training ....
freedom of informacion
69/ Generally speaking, (SHOW CARD) how do you feel about vie
172. number of peopla of anochar nacionslifty, living in our country : are they too many, a lot but not too many or not many ?
b) and whic about people of mothe: race living in our councry ara they too imany. J lot but not too many or not undny ?
c) and what about peoplc of anochez religion living in our councry are chay too inany, s lot buc not coo many or not many ?
d) ind what sbout people with another cultcure living in our country : are they too many. a lot buc not too thany or nor many ?
e) and what about paople belonging to another social class living ill our country? are they tou maly, $د$ loc but not too many or not many?


EURO-BAROMETRE 30-7-
Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988
173/ Quand on parie d'une personne dune autre nationalité, à qui 174. pensex-yous ? (Quelle nationalité ?) (HE RIEM SUGGERER. LAISSER LE TEMPS DE REPONDRE).
175. Quand on parle d'une personne d'une autre roce, a qui pensez-vous ? (Quelle race ?) (NE RIEN SUGGERER. LAISSER I.E TEMPS DE REPONDREI
176. Quand on parle d'une personne dune autre religion, à qui pensez-rous ? (Quelle religion ?) (NE RIEM SUGGERER. LAISSER LE TEMPS DE REPONDRE).

177/ Quana on parle d'une personne d'une autre culcure, a qui
178. pensez-vous ? (Que lie culture ?) (AE RIEN SUGGERER. LAISSER LE TEMPS OE REPONTJREI.

179/ Quand on parle d'une personne d'une autre classe sociale, a 180. qui pensez-vous ? (Quelle classe sociale?) (NE RIEN SUGGERER. IAISSER LE TEMPS DE REPONURE).

223/ Curtaines personnes sont gènées par les opinions. les
225. habitudés, el la facon d'ētre de gens differents d’euxmémes. Yous personnellement, dans votre vie de tous les jours, trouvez-yous gènante la presence de personnes d'une autre nationalite ?
b) Et trouvez-vous gènante la prèsence de personnes diune autre race
c) Et trouvez-vous gènante la présence de personnes d'une autre religion
d) Et trouver-vous gènance la présence de personnes d'une autre culture
e) Et trouvez-vous génante la prèsence de personnes dune autre classe sociale

| 223 | 224 | 225 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gênante | pas gênante | $?$ |
| 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 |

Personnes d'une dutre race
Personnes d'une dutre religion
Personnes diune autre culture
Persorines d'une autre classe sociale

SUKO-BMROMTSAR 30 -7
cuds 20 octobre 19 about peopla of anocher micionality, to whon do i74. you think of (What nationalicy ?) (DO wot sucgrss. Do wot PRON(PT).
75. When you hear about people of anocher race, to whon do you chink of (What race ?) (DO yOT SOCCEST. DO NOT PROMPT).
76. When you hear about people of another religion, to whom do you think of (what religion ?) (DO NOT SUGGBST. DO NOT PROM(T).

77/ When you hear about people with anocher culture, to whom do 178. you think of thinat culcure ?) (DO NOT SUGGKST. DO NOT PROMPT).

179/ when you hedr about people belonging tu anocher social class, 180. to whot do you chink of (whar sucial class ?) (DO wor SUCGRST. DO HOT PROKPT)

223/ some peuple are disturbed by the opinions, cuscoms and way of 225. life of pcople different rom cheroselves. Do you personally, in your daily life find disturbing the presence of people of anocher nationality?
b) And do you find disturbing the aresence of people of nother race ?
c) And do you find discurbing the presence of people of anocher religion?
(t) And do you find discurbing the presence of people with anothar culture?
e) And do you find discucbing chu presence of people belonging to another social alass?
223
Disturbing not disturbing
225
7
. people of another nationality people of another race
people of snother religion

| 1 | 1 | 1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 | 3 |

people with anothar eulture

- people velonging to. anocher social
class 5
226/ From this list (Suow LIST) I vould like you to cell me if

228. therc are mathy such people, it tev, or nant who live in your neighbourhoot?

|  | $\begin{aligned} & 226 \\ & \text { Nany } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 227 \\ & \text { Fes } \end{aligned}$ | 228 <br> Hane |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| people of anothar nationalicy | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| people of another race | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| people of snother religion | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| puople with anocher culcure | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| people belonging to another social |  |  |  |
| class | 5 | s | 5 |

229/Are there many such propla, few or none that count anong your 231. friends ?

| 229 | 230 | 231 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rany | Pew | Hane |
| 1 | 1 |  |
| 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 4 | 3 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 |

euro-baronetre $30-b$ -
jeudi 20 Octobre 1988
232/ Et y a-t-il deaucoup de personnes de ces catégories qui 235. travaillent avec vous ?

| B | $\begin{gathered} \text { Beaucoup } \\ 232 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Que lques } \\ & \text { unes } \\ & 233 \end{aligned}$ | Aucune 234 | Ne Cravaille pas 235 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Personnes a'une autre nationalité. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Personnes d'une autre race | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Personnes d'une autre religion | n 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Personnes d'une autre culture. | . 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Personnes d'une autre classe socisile | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 |

236/ Je vais vous dire certaines opinions. Pour chacune
243. pouvez-vous ne dire si celd s'applique ou non aux personnes pouvez-vous ne dire si celd s'applique ou non dux personnes
appartenant a lune ou l'autre de ces categories? (montrer CARTE. PLUSIEURS REPOHSES POSSIBLES PAR LIGME)
a. Personnes d'une autre nationalité
b. Persomnes d'une dutre race
c. Personnes d'une autre religion
d. Personnes d'une autre culture

Personnes d'une dutre classe sociale
Aucune de ces categories
Toutes ces catégories
236. La présence de leurs enfants
en grand nombre, dans une è-
cole, diminue la qualité de
l'enseignement ..................... 1.2
237. Ils abusent de la sècurité sociale

70
238. Leurs habitudes sont difficiles à comprendre........... 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 0
239. Leur présence accentue le chomage (des nationaux) .... 1
240. Leur prèsence est l'une des causes de la délinquance et de l'insécurité $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$.............. $\quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5 \quad$ b $\quad 7 \quad 0$
241. Le mariage avec l'un de leurs membres finit toujours mal. $1 \begin{array}{llllllll} & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 0\end{array}$
242. St l'un d'eux habite votre immeuble, cela crée des histoires ........................ $\quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5 \quad 6 \quad 7 \quad 0$
243. 5'ils habitent votre quartier, cela fait changer les prix
dans le marché de liimnobilier $1 \begin{array}{lllllll} & 3 & 4 & 5 & 5 & 0\end{array}$

EURO-haroctitar $30-8$ -
scudi 20 Occobre !998
232/ Are they many such people, A lew. or none tho work uict 235. you ?

|  | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Kany } \\ 232 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { rew } \\ & 233 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1000 \\ & 234 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mot } \\ & \text { oployed } \\ & 235 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| prople of anocher nationality | 1 | 1 | ! | 1 |
| people of ariocher race | ? | 2 | ? | 2 |
| people of another religion | 3 | J | J | J |
| feople wich anorter culture | d | 4 | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| pcople belonging to anocher sowid |  |  |  |  |
| class | 5 | 5 | $s$ | $s$ |

236/I am going co read you out opinions. for cach opinion $I$ resd
243. our, please call ins co thich, it any, kifids or people it applies. (SHCW CAND. ONE)
a. people of another nacionality
b. peuple of another race
c. pcoplc of anocher religion
d. people with another culcure
e. people belunging to mother socidl cisis
f. None
g. A11
o. ?
236. If chere are a lot of cheir chiddren
in a school it reduces che level of cuucation
237. They exploit social security benafics 123 J $4 \quad 5 \quad 670$
238. Their customs se difficult to understant
239. Thefs presenex in arr country baceedses inemployment for (nutionals)
240. Their presence is one of che causeds of delinguancy and violence
241. Marrying inco one of thase groups always ends badly
242. To tave them as neignbour creatus probleas
243. Their presance in the naighbourhood modifies the prices of property

EURO-EAROWETRE 30-12-
Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988

268/ Parlons maintenant des personnes résidant en (pays) et qui
270. ne sont pas originaires d'un pays membre de la Communate europèenne. torsque lion parle de ces personnes, à qui pensez-vous ?
271. A propos de ces personnes qui résident en (pays) et qui ne sont pas originaires de la Comilundute europénne, pouvezvous the dire laquelle de ces trois possibilites vous paraft préférable pur definir leur situation ? (Homther CARIE. UnE SEULE REPOKSEI.

1. Les gouvernements des pays memores décident chacun pour so sans consulter les autres
2. Les gouvernemerizs des pays membres se consultent avant d'agir, afin de legiférer nationalement de façon semblable
3. Les institations de la Communaté européenne (Commission curopenne, Conseil des ministres. Parlement curopéen) agissent pour aboutir d une legisidtion comime applicable dans tous les peys menbres, y compris en (pays)
4. ?
5. Toujours en ce qui concerne ces personnes, pensez-vous qu'il foudraic ..
6. aneliorer leurs aroits
7. restreinare leurs droits
8. oul les mainterif comule ils sont
0.?
huno-harcmerther $30-12$ -
Jeudi 20 Octobrc 1908

268/ Now let us talk about people living in (councry) who aze 270. neither (nationalizy) nor citizen of tha EEC. When you hear sbout such peoplo whon do you think of ?

271. Talking about these people living in (country) who are noither (nationalicy) nor ejeizen of the European Commantey, which of chese kays of doing wauld you preter co detine cheis scacus ? (SHOW LIST).

1. Governmencs of cach member state should nake its own decision without consulting the ochers.
2. Governments of the member states should consult each others before any action, in order to legislace nacionaly in a similar fustion
3. The itseicutions of the E'uropann Community (Commission, Councit of Nindster, European Purliananel take the necussary secion to atrive: at a common loyislation chac will dirately dpply to all Member councrics, that is in fyour councry) ds well as elswhere
4. Talking of thuse people, do you think chat we should ...
5. Excend their rights
6. Restrict their rights
7. Leave chings as chey dre
o. 7

EURO-BARONEIRE $30-13$
Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988
273. Et pensez-vous que leur prėsence est, pour l'avenir de notre pays, une bonne chose, une assez bonne chose, une assez mauvaise chose, ou une mauraise chose ?

1. Une bonne chose
2. Une assez bonne chose
3. Une assez mauraise chose
4. ?

274/ Que pourrait-on faire si l'on voulait amèliorer les rapports 276. entre tes (nationaux) et les (non nationaux) résidant ici? Pour chacune des propositions suivances, pourriez-vous me dire si celd serait une bonne idèe ou bien si cela serait une inauvaise idèe?

| 274 | 275 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Bonne <br> idéu | Muvaise <br> ideée |

Poursuivre devant les tribundux les auteurs de paroles, d'écrits, ou d'acte d'inspirdtion raciste ou xènophobe ........................ 1 1

Promouvoir l'enseignement de ld tolérance et du respect mutuel

- Encourager des rencontres entre les (natio-
naux) et.. les autres dans les quartiers el
les associations .......................................... 3


Veiller a ce que le personnel des services publics et les enseignants se comportent de
la méme maniére avec les (nationaux) et les (non-nat ionaux)

Faciliter la naturalisation de leurs membres
$\gamma$
Etendre des programmes d'échanges interna-
tiondux de jeunes ....................................
médias sur le röle qu'ils peuvent jouer dans
l'èlimination des préjugés racidux
276/ ll existe des mouvements et des organisations qui prennent
278. pnsition a l'égard de l'imaigration étrangère. Your chacun des mouvements sulvants, pouvez-vous ne dire si yous d'approuvez cout a fait si vous l'approuvez plutot, si yous le dėsapprouvez plutōt ou st vous le dèsapprouvez tout à idit?

| APPRRUYE |  | DESAPPROUYE |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tout |  |  | Tout i |
| fait | Plutōt | Plutot | fait |

277. Les mouvements racistes $\quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 0$
278. Les mouvenents contre le ricisme ................. 1 2 3
279. Yoici une liste de textes qui ont pour but daffirmer les droits de l'home et du citoyen. Avez-vous entendu parler de l'un ou l'autre de ces textes? s! OU!, desquels? (HOMTRER La CARTE. PLUSIEURS REPORSES POSSI8LESI'.
280. Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies de 1948
281. Convention de souvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales du Conscil de l'£urope en 1950
282. Uéclaration comme contre le racisme et la xenophobie faite par les institutions de la Commanaté europénne en 1986
283. J'si entensu parler des droits de l'homne, mais pas de ces textes en particulier (SPOMTAME)
284. "I'a pas entendu parler du tout de ces textes
285. ?

EUhC-anficeten $30-13$ -
Jeudi 20 occabra 1988
273. Scill calking sbout chea, do you Uidnk cilst wett presence here is a goad ching, good co sivine extenc, tud to sione extent or abaj ching for the future of our country?

A goos ching
2. Cood to some extens
3. Had to somet excent
\&. A bad thing

274 /hat could be done if one wanced to inprove the relacions
276. between (nacionals) and (man nationals) livang here ? for each of the followitig. could you well me it thds would de d yood idoa or د bad ides ?

| * | cood <br> ching <br> 274 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Had } \\ & \text { ching } \\ & 275 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{2}^{7}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Prosecute in the coures people who say, write. or to enings which are racise or anci-foreigner | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Promote the tesching of tolersnce and aucual respect in che schools | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Encourage contace between (nationals) dind ochers both in the neighbourhoud and in associacions |  | 3 | J |
| tejen the language of others | 4 | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| know the culcurd customs of ochers | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Insuru chat paple in the public services and teachers ercat (nationals) and (non rationals) canally | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| hake macuralizacion easier | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Expand incernacional exchange programess for young people | 8 | * | 0 |
| Deaw the actencion of people in the prosis. radio and tV to the part they can play in eliminat ing racial prajudjecs | ${ }^{-}$ | 9 | 9 |

277/ Thera afe movaments and organisations who cake a parcicular
278. point of viun about loreign inmigration. for each of che following could you call me if you spprove completely, to somo extenc, or disspprove to somo axtent or completely?

277. Movements in favor of racism .................. 1 2 0
278. Movements opposend to rseism ............... . .
279. Here is a list (SHOw LIST) of docmments which have the Were is d ist (SHOw inss) of documents which have the
obinctives of affirming hum righes and che righcs of che citizen. Have you huard of wiy of theta ? (If Res), which ones ?

1. The Uniced Nations Universad Dectaracion of human righes of 1948
. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamentsl Frecdors of cha council of Europe in 1950

Common Declaracion Against Racjsin and Xenophobia by the Institutions of the Eucopaan Comnunicy in 1986

1. I tinve heard of human righce buc of none of these cercs an pircicular (MLUNTAKARD)
2. Has not heard at all of these texts

| EURO-BARONETRE 30-14- <br> Jeudi 20 Octobre 1988 <br> 280. Irouvez-vous que les institutions européennes sont suffisament actives en matiére de protection des droits de l'nomie, ou qu'elles ne sant pas assez actives? | ```EURO-RAROMETER 30 - 14 - Jeodi 20 Octobre 1988 200. Do you think chat che suropean instituclons ara``` |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1. Suffisamment actives | 1. sufficientiy active in protocting human rights |
| 2. Pas assez actives | 2. not sufficiently active in protecting human fights |
| 0.? | 0. ? |
| ENQUETEUR : YOUS POUYEZ IMTERROMPRE L'IHTERYIEX A CET endroit si l'imtervieve paralt fatlgue. prendre remoez-vous POUR IERHIMER L'IMTERYIEM. |  If TUS RESPONDENT LOOKS TIRED. UAVE AN APPOINTEEMT TO FINISA THE YHTERVIEN. |
| - ARRET (A) | $S T O P$ (A) |


[^0]:    1 More details about these variables are given in the Annex.

[^1]:    1 Total slightly above 100 due to a mumber of multiple answers.

[^2]:    1 see below.
    2 see "Citoyennete, nationalité et immigration" by Catherine Withol de Wendel - published by Arcantere, 1986.

[^3]:    1 Total exceeds 100 due to multiple answers.

[^4]:    countries such as Belgium or Germany where a mumber of nationalities are mentioned at comparable levels of importance;
    countries such as Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom where associations made by the respondents clearly point to non-European populations;
    finally, in countries with low levels of immigration (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal) people find it less easy to identify a non-national and tend more to mention European nationals as foreigners;

    In this context Iuxemboung seems to be a special case.

[^5]:    1 See annex for construction of this indicator.
    2 A precise description of the question has already been given on p. 20.

[^6]:    * This question has been set out in part two on p. 1. This indicator takes into account answers concerning nationality, race and religion. Respondents have been divided into five groups:
    . Many (3): those who answered "many" at least three times.
    . Many (1): those who answered "many" at least once.
    . Some (3): those who answered "some" at least three tumes.
    . Some (1): those who answered "some" at least once.

[^7]:    1 For the full text of this question see part two of the report.
    2 See part two of this report.

